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Abstract—Disassembly of binary code is hard, but necessary
for improving the security of binary software. Over the past
few decades, research in binary disassembly has produced many
tools and frameworks, which have been made available to
researchers and security professionals. These tools employ a
variety of strategies that grant them different characteristics.
The lack of systematization, however, impedes new research in
the area and makes selecting the right tool hard, as we do
not understand the strengths and weaknesses of existing tools.
In this paper, we systematize binary disassembly through the
study of nine popular, open-source tools. We couple the manual
examination of their code bases with the most comprehensive
experimental evaluation (thus far) using 3,788 binaries. Our
study yields a comprehensive description and organization of
strategies for disassembly, classifying them as either algorithm
or else heuristic. Meanwhile, we measure and report the impact
of individual algorithms on the results of each tool. We find that
while principled algorithms are used by all tools, they still heavily
rely on heuristics to increase code coverage. Depending on the
heuristics used, different coverage-vs-correctness trade-offs come
in play, leading to tools with different strengths and weaknesses.
We envision that these findings will help users pick the right tool
and assist researchers in improving binary disassembly.
I. INTRODUCTION
The disassembly of binary programs is a crucial task in
reverse engineering and software security, and it is a core
component of innumerable works on malware analysis [54],
code-similarity measurement [17, 42, 55], vulnerability dis-
covery [25, 66, 82, 95], security retrofitting [2, 78, 80,
100, 104, 109, 111] and patching [11]. However, correctly
disassembling a binary is challenging, mainly owing to the
loss of information (e.g., symbols and types) occurring when
compiling a program to machine code and the complexity of
constructs (e.g., jump tables, data embedded in code, etc.) used
to efficiently implement language features.
Binary disassembly has seen remarkable advancements in
the past decade, awarding researchers and developers with a
variety of tools and frameworks, under both open source [3,
33, 90, 94, 95, 102, 103] and commercial [36, 74] licenses.
These tools have lifted a significant burden off researchers
that aim to develop new, advanced binary analysis techniques.
This new plurality of options encapsulates a broad variety
of underlying strategies with different guarantees, which fall
under two categories:
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TABLE I: The group of open-source tools that our study covers
and representative works that use those tools.
Tool (Version) Source (Release Date) Public Use
PSI (1.0) Website [63] (Sep 2014) [50, 88, 111]
UROBOROS (0.11) Github [93] (Nov. 2016) [103]
DYNINST (9.3.2) Github [79] (April 2017) [7, 18, 69, 73, 96]
OBJDUMP (2.30) GNU [47] (Jan. 2018) [21, 103, 111]
GHIDRA (9.0.4) Github [75] (May 2019) [24, 45, 91]
MCSEMA (2.0.0) Github [13] (Jun. 2019) [22, 41, 44]
ANGR (8.19.7.25) Github [8] (Oct. 2019) [20, 71, 81, 98, 112]
BAP (2.1.0) Github [26] (Mar. 2020) [10, 16, 64]
RADARE2 (4.4.0) Github [89] (April 2020) [4, 31, 52, 58]
• Algorithms typically produce results with some correct-
ness guarantees. They mostly leverage knowledge from the
binary (e.g., symbols), the machine (e.g., instruction set),
and/or the ABI (e.g., calling conventions).
• Heuristics are based on common patterns and typically do
not offer assurances of correctness.
Moreover, each tool adopts a different set of strategies, with
technical details not always fully documented or publicized.
To complicate the matters, the implemented strategies have
evolved over time, further deviating from documentation. The
above have created a knowledge gap that impedes the users
of these tools and, specifically, binary analysis researchers. To
bridge the gap, we must answer several questions:
• Q1 – What are the algorithms and heuristics used in existing
disassembly tools and how do they interact?
• Q2 – What is the coverage & accuracy of heuristic methods
in comparison to algorithmic ones? Are there trade-offs?
• Q3 – What errors do existing disassembly tools make and
what are the underlying causes?
To answer these questions, this paper presents a system-
atization of binary disassembly research, through the study
of nine popular open-source tools shown in Table I. Unlike
past research [5, 56, 68, 77, 105], we study these tools both
qualitatively and quantitatively to understand the tools not only
as a whole, but also their individual algorithms and heuristics.
More specifically, our qualitative study of the tools is
based on manually inspecting source code. This allows us
to answer Q1 by presenting their exact and most recent
strategies, avoiding ambiguities and out-of-date information
found in documentation and publications. The quantitative
study answers questions Q2–Q3 by applying the tools on a
corpus of 3,788 benchmark binaries, consisting of utilities,
client/server programs, and popular libraries on both Linux
and Windows systems (see Table IV). To evaluate the tools
in terms of coverage and accuracy, we built an analysis
framework based on LLVM, GCC, the Gold Linker, and Visual
Studio to automatically collect the ground truth while building
the corpus. We evaluate the tools by individually measuring
different disassembly phases to quantify the effectiveness of
the strategies employed. Our evaluation presents the degree of
use, precision, and pitfalls of each component of each tool.
By systematically dissecting and evaluating the tools, we
were able to make new observations that amend or comple-
ment prior knowledge. Our major observations include: (1)
For better coverage, mainstream tools incorporate heuristics in
nearly every phase of disassembly. These heuristics are heavily
used in disassembling real-world binaries and, without them,
the tools cannot provide practical utility in many tasks. (2)
Heuristics typically cannot provide correctness assurances and
lead to various errors, particularly when encountering complex
constructs. Moreover, previous works may have overestimated
the reliability of those heuristics. For instance, a recent study
[5] (unintentionally) overstated the accuracy of linear sweep
because many benchmarks containing data-in-code were not
considered. (3) Tools may share the same group of algorithms
and heuristics, however, they organize and combine them
differently, leading to different accuracy-coverage trade-offs.
(4) Tools have different strengths across different tasks. For
instance, commercial tools are better at recovering instructions
but open source tools can better identify cross-references.
Contributions: Our main contributions are as follows:
• We present a thorough systematization of binary disassem-
bly from the perspective of algorithms and heuristics. To our
knowledge, this is the first research that can answer Q1–Q3.
• We developed a compiler-based framework for automated
end-to-end collection of ground truth for binary disassembly.
We used it to compose a benchmark data set for assessing
binary disassembly tools. The framework and benchmarks
are available at https://github.com/junxzm1990/x86-sok.
• We present, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive
evaluation of open-source disassembly tools. Our analysis
unveils the prevalence of heuristics, their contribution to
disassembly, and shortcomings.
• We make new observations and improve the understanding
of binary-disassembly strategies and tools. We envision that
these insights will facilitate future research in the area of
disassembly and drive improvements in existing tools.
II. SCOPE OF SYSTEMATIZATION
A. Functionality
In general, binary disassembly can involve different tasks
based on the context of use. This work focuses on tasks that
relate to binary-software security. Table II classifies popular
security works and summarizes the information each class
needs to recover from binary code. Our study accordingly
concentrates on the disassembly aspects of providing them:
Disassembly is the process of recovering the assembly in-
structions of a binary. Perfect disassembly separates data from
TABLE II: Popular solutions of binary security and the in-
formation the solutions need from binary disassembly. “Inst”,
“CFG”, “Func”, and “Xrefs” respectively mean legitimate in-
structions, control flow graph, functions, and cross references.
Category Solutions & Required Information
Vulnerability Finding [25, 34, 97] Inst, CFG, Func, Xrefs
Control Flow
Integrity
[37, 80, 100, 108, 109, 111]
[19, 38, 51, 72, 85, 87, 99] Inst, CFG, Func
Code Layout
Randomization
[28, 53, 60, 104]
[61, 65, 78, 106, 109] Inst, CFG, Func, Xrefs
Execute-only Code [21, 110] Inst, CFG
Legacy-code Patching [11, 101, 102, 103] Inst, CFG, Func, Xrefs
Code Similarity
Measurement
[14, 17, 40, 42, 55, 57, 82]
[15, 29, 30, 43, 62, 70, 83] Inst, CFG, Func
Software Fault Isolation [38, 39, 67, 107] Inst, CFG, Func
Software De-bloating [46, 86, 92] Inst, CFG, Func
code regions and correctly identifies the instructions that were
emitted by the compiler or introduced by the developer.
Symbolization determines cross-references (xrefs for short)
or precisely, numeric values in the binary that are references
of other code or data objects. Depending on the location of the
reference and the location of the target, there are four types
of xrefs: code-to-code (c2c), code-to-data (c2d), data-to-code
(d2c), and data-to-data (d2d).
Function Entry Identification locates the entry points of
functions. A special but important case is the main function.
CFG Reconstruction re-builds the control flow graph (CFG)
of a binary program. We consider direct control transfers,
indirect jumps/calls, tail calls, and non-returning functions.
B. Targeted Binaries
Similarly to the majority of the works we study, we focus on
binaries with the following key properties: (1) They have been
produced with mainstream compilers and linkers; (2) Binaries
may include hand-written assembly; (3) They have not been
obfuscated; (4) We do not assume symbol availability, i.e.,
binaries are stripped; (5) We only consider X86/X64 binaries.
The majority of effort in prior works has focused on such
binaries, owing to the popularity of the architectures; (6) They
run on Linux or Windows operating systems.
C. Targeted Tools
Our systematization is based on study of disassembly tools.
We use five criteria to select tools: (1) They are designated for
disassembly or have an independent module for disassembly.
(2) They can do automated disassembly without user interac-
tions. (3) They are open source tools so that we can study
their implemented strategies. (4) They have unique strategies
that are not fully covered by other tools. (5) They can run our
targeted binaries to support our quantitative evaluation.
Following the above criteria, we selected 9 tools, as listed
in Table I. We also looked at JakStab [59], RetDec [32],
and BinCat [12] but excluded them in the study because (1)
JakStab cannot run our benchmark binaries due to a parsing
error (https://github.com/jkinder/jakstab/issues/9); (2) RetDec
aims for de-compilation; it uses preliminary strategies for
disassembly, which are all covered by other tools we selected;
(3) BinCat requires user interactions to do disassembly. The
disassembly results vary upon different user interactions.
TABLE III: The specifics of existing algorithms (numbered with rings like À) and heuristics (numbered with discs like ¶).
Alg. Algorithms & Heuristics Goals Tools
D
is
as
se
m
bl
y LinearSweep
1 Start from code addresses with symbols Code accuracy OBJDUMP, PSI, UROBOROS
1 Continuous scanning for instructions Code coverage OBJDUMP, PSI, UROBOROS
2 Skip bad opcodes Code accuracy OBJDUMP
3 Replace padding and re-disassembly Code accuracy PSI
4 Exclude code around errors Code accuracy UROBOROS
Recursive
Descent
2 Follow control flow to do disassembly Code accuracy DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP, RADARE2
3 Start from program entry, main, and symbols Code accuracy DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP, RADARE2
5 Function entry matching Code coverage DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP, RADARE2
6 Linear sweep code gaps Code coverage ANGR
7 Disassembly from targets of xrefs Code coverage GHIDRA, RADARE2
Sy
m
bo
liz
at
io
n
Xrefs
4 Exclude data units that are floating points Xref accuracy ANGR
8 Brute force operands and data units Xref coverage UROBOROS, MCSEMA, GHIDRA, ANGR
9 Pointers in data have machine size Xref accuracy UROBOROS, MCSEMA, GHIDRA, ANGR
10 Alignment of pointers in data Xref accuracy UROBOROS, MCSEMA, GHIDRA
11 Pointers in data or referenced by other xrefs can be non-aligned Xref coverage GHIDRA, ANGR
12 References to code can only point to function entries Xref accuracy GHIDRA
13 Enlarge boundaries of data regions Xref coverage GHIDRA, ANGR
14 Address tables have minimal size of 2 Xref accuracy GHIDRA
15 Exclude pointers that may overlap with a string Xref accuracy MCSEMA, GHIDRA
16 While scanning data regions, use step-length based on type inference Xref accuracy ANGR
Fu
nc
tio
n
E
nt
ry
MAIN
Function
5 Identify main based on arguments to __libc_start_main Func coverage ANGR, BAP
17 Identify main using patterns in _start/__scrt_common_main_seh Func coverage DYNINST, RADARE2
General
Function
6 Identify function entries based on symbols Func coverage DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP, RADARE2
7 Identify function entries based on exception information Func coverage GHIDRA
8 Identify function entries based on targets of direct calls Func coverage DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP, RADARE2
9 Identify function entries by resolving indirect calls Func coverage GHIDRA, ANGR
18 Identify function entries based on prologues/decision-tree Func coverage DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP, RADARE2
19 Consider begins of code discovered by linear scan as function entries Func coverage ANGR
C
FG
Indirect
Jump
10 Use VSA to resolve jump table targets CFG accuracy DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR
20 Follow patterns to determine jump tables CFG accuracy DYNINST, GHIDRA, RADARE2
21 Discard jump tables with index bound larger than a threshold CFG accuracy GHIDRA, ANGR, RADARE2
22 Restrict the depth of slice for VSA Efficiency DYNINST, ANGR
Indirect Call 11 Identify targets based on constant propagation CFG coverage GHIDRA, ANGR
Tail Call
12 Consider a jump to the start of another function as a tail call CFG accuracy DYNINST, ANGR
23 Determine tail call based on distance between the jump and its target CFG accuracy RADARE2
24 A tail call and its target cross multiple functions CFG accuracy GHIDRA
25 Tail calls cannot be conditional jumps CFG accuracy GHIDRA, ANGR
26 A tail call tears down its stack CFG accuracy DYNINST, ANGR
27 A tail call does not jump to the middle of a function CFG accuracy ANGR
28 Target of a tail call cannot be target of any conditional jumps CFG accuracy ANGR
Non-returning
Function
13 Identify system calls or library functions that are known non-returning CFG accuracy DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP, RADARE2
14 Identify functions with no ret and no tail calls that return CFG accuracy DYNINST, ANGR, RADARE2
15 Identify functions that always call non-returning functions CFG accuracy BAP
29 Detect non-returning functions based on fall-through after the call-sites CFG accuracy GHIDRA
III. ANALYSIS OF TOOLS
To understand the strategies employed in today’s binary
disassembly tools, we studied 9 representative examples in
Table I. These tools have varying popularity and cover nearly
all publicly known techniques in binary disassembly [105].
Our investigation is primarily based on studying source
code, instead of solely relying on available documentation
and publications. Source code reflects the exact semantics of
the strategies applied, protecting us from ambiguities in the
documents. Also, many tools have evolved over time and their
corresponding documentation and publications are out-of-date.
The rest of this section presents our findings, summarized in
Table III. We assign a number to each algorithm and heuristic,
respectively placing it within a ring (e.g., 1 ) or disc (e.g., 1 ).
A. Algorithms and Heuristics in Disassembly
The disassembly strategies we study fall into two broad and
well-known classes: linear sweep and recursive descent.
Linear Sweep [OBJDUMP, PSI, UROBOROS]: Linear sweep
continuously scans pre-selected code ranges and identifies
valid instructions ( 1 ), exploiting the rationale that modern
assemblers tend to layout code successively to reduce the
binary’s size. In general, a linear sweep strategy can be
described by how it selects sweep ranges and how it handles
errors during scanning. As such, we summarize algorithms
according to these two aspects.
All tools in this class follow OBJDUMP to select code
regions for sweep: they process code ranges specified by sym-
bols in the .symtab and .dynsym sections ( 1 ), followed by
jmp loc / jmp * / ret
0x0 0x* (padding)
0x0 0x* (padding)
…
(bad)
...
jmp loc / jmp * / ret /call
0x0 0x* (padding) 
0x0 0x* (padding) 
…
0x0 (mid of inst) 0x*
jmp (mid of inst)
①
② ③
①②
③ ④ f2e0: retqf2e1: 66 *    nopw %cs *
f2e8: 0x0 (padding) 0x*
…
f2ef: 0x0 *    add %cl * 
3c40: callq f2f0 ①
②
③ ④
(a) Handling bad opcode (b) Handling invalid control flow (c) Case-b error PSI’s idea can handle
Fig. 1: Error-handling by PSI. Part (a) and part (b) respectively
show the handling of bad opcode and invalid control transfers.
Part (c) is an invalid control-transfer from BinUtils that PSI
should handle but the actual implementation does not.
remaining gaps in the code sections. In a general sense, these
ranges comprehensively encapsulate legitimate instructions.
Various heuristics are used for error detection and handling.
OBJDUMP deems invalid opcodes as errors, skips a byte, and
resumes scanning ( 2 ). Beyond invalid opcodes, PSI considers
control transfers to non-instructions as errors. Furthermore,
PSI has more sophisticated error-handling as shown in Fig. 1.
Upon a bad opcode, PSI traces backwards from the erroneous
instruction to a non-fall-through control transfer (unconditional
jump, indirect jump, or return) and identifies padding after that
control transfer. Replacing the padding with nop instructions,
PSI then re-runs linear-sweep for re-disassembly ( 3 ). When
encountering an invalid control transfer, the public version of
PSI only handles cases where the transfer part is correct but
code around the target contains errors. Specifically, it checks
the code around the target, seeks a preceding instruction that
starts with zero, and finally identifies a further preceding non-
fall-through control transfer and its following padding. Again,
PSI will replace the padding with nop instructions and re-
run linear-sweep. UROBOROS follows a similar idea as PSI.
But instead of re-disassembly, UROBOROS simply excludes
the code around the error locations ( 4 ).
The design of PSI can handle cases like the one in Fig. 1(c).
Its implementation, however, is too restrictive for high effec-
tiveness. For instance, the public version of PSI only considers
zero-started padding and cannot correct the error in Fig. 1(c).
To sum up, linear sweep aggressively scans all possible code
and hence, maximizes the recovery of instructions. However,
it can run into errors due to data-in-code. To address errors,
existing tools rely on heuristics for correction, which are less
comprehensive and can have limited utility (§ IV-B1).
Recursive Descent [DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP,
RADARE2]: Recursive descent starts with a given code address
and performs disassembly following the control flow ( 2 ).
Strategies in this category usually consist of three components:
(1) how to select code addresses, (2) how to resolve control
flow, and (3) how to handle the code gaps left by recursive
disassembly. Accordingly, we summarize the existing tools
based on the three components.
All the tools we study consider the program entry and
available symbols as code addresses for recursive disassembly
( 3 ). These addresses are, in principle, known to be safe.
Further, ANGR, BAP, DYNINST and RADARE2 also discover
the main function and the details are covered in § III-C.
When encountering direct control transfers, the tools expand
the disassembly to the targets. However, to handle indirect
control transfers, different tools adopt different approaches. We
will cover the details in § III-D. Another challenging part of
control flow is to determine non-returning functions. Related
details are also discussed in § III-D.
As indirect control flows are (formally and practically)
undecidable, recursive descent often leaves behind code gaps.
Our evaluation in § IV-B1 shows that recursive disassembly
alone can miss 49.35% of the code on average. As such,
existing tools incorporate heuristics to enlarge code coverage,
which inevitably jeopardizes correctness guarantees. The most
common heuristic, used by ANGR, DYNINST, RADARE2,
BAP, and GHIDRA, searches for function entry points in the
code gaps based on common function prologues / epilogues or
pre-trained decision-tree models [9] ( 5 ). On finding a function
entry, the tools will consider it as a new starting point for
recursive disassembly. According to our evaluation (§ IV-B3),
function-entry matching on average identifies 17.36% of all
the functions, leading to a 31.55% increase of code coverage.
Beyond function matching, existing tools also use heuristics
that are more aggressive. ANGR performs linear sweep on the
code gaps and recursive disassembly on legitimate instructions
( 6 ). In case of errors, ANGR skips the current basic block
and moves to the next bytes. This linear scan increases the
code coverage of ANGR by around 8.20%. However, it will
misidentify data as code (e.g., Listing 2 in Appendix G).
GHIDRA includes targets of xrefs in recursive descent ( 7 ).
This strategy discovers 4.33% more code coverage. However,
the xrefs are mostly collected with heuristics, which can lead
to errors like Listing 3 in Appendix G.
In summary, strict recursive descent ensures correctness but
often produces insufficient coverage. To expand code cov-
erage, existing tools incorporate many aggressive heuristics
that undermine the correctness guarantees (§ IV-B1).
B. Algorithms and Heuristics in Symbolization
Symbolization identifies numerical values in the binary that
are actually references to code or data objects. Tools generally
follow the workflow in Fig. 2.
Constant Operand and Data Unit Extraction [ANGR,
GHIDRA, UROBOROS, MCSEMA]: These tools start by identi-
fying numerical values that are potential pointers. They search
through all instructions to identify constant operands and scan
the non-code regions to find data units ( 8 ). As identification
of constant operands is trivial, we omit the details and focus on
data units. In general, a data unit is composed of consecutive
n-bytes at an aligned address. However, different tools have
varying choices of n, alignment, and non-code regions:
• All tools assume that a data unit’s size is the same as the
machine size, i.e., 4 bytes in 32-bit and 8 bytes in 64-bit
binaries ( 9 ). This assumption, however, is not always true.
Listing 4 in Appendix G shows a jump table with 4-byte
entries from a 64-bit binary. In such cases, the assumption
about a data unit’s size can mislead symbolization in tools
that do not otherwise handle jump tables (e.g., UROBOROS).
Instructions
Constant Operand Extract
q UROBOROS, ANGR,GHIDRA,MCSEMA
Code Pointer Check
q UROBOROS
q ANGR
q GHIDRA
qMCSEMA
Data Pointer Check
q UROBORS
q ANGR
q GHIDRA
qMCSEMA
Address Table Check
q UROBOROS
q ANGR
q GHIDRA
qMCSEMA
Code & Data Pointers
Data Type Inference
q ANGR
q GHIDRA
Code Pointers Data Pointers
Data Unit Extract
q UROBOROS
q ANGR
q GHIDRA
qMCSEMA
Non-instruction Regions
Fig. 2: A general workflow of symbolization.
• UROBOROS and MCSEMA use machine-size alignment (10).
GHIDRA assumes a 4-byte alignment unless a data unit is
the target of another xref. In the latter case, GHIDRA has
no alignment requirement (11). ANGR enforces no alignment
requirement (11) due to observations of unaligned point-
ers [101]. Our evaluation shows that the choice of alignment
is a coverage-accuracy trade-off: around 600 pointers are
saved at non-aligned addresses while the no alignment
assumption leads to nearly 60% of ANGR’s false positives.
• Besides data segments, GHIDRA and ANGR also search for
data units from non-disassembled code regions.
Data Unit Type Inference [ANGR, GHIDRA]: In operand
extraction, ANGR and GHIDRA infer the types of data units
when possible. ANGR identifies memory loads from data units.
If the loaded values flow to floating-point instructions, ANGR
marks the data units as floating points. This inference is in
general reliable as it follows data flow. GHIDRA uses a more
aggressive strategy: given a constant operand “pointing” to a
data unit, GHIDRA considers the data unit to be the start of a
string if it is followed by a sequence of ASCII/Unicode bytes
and a null-byte. Otherwise, GHIDRA deems the data unit to be
a pointer if the value inside meets the following conditions:
(1) the value is at least 4096; (2) the value is an address of
an instruction or an address in a non-code region; (3) if the
value is an address of an instruction in a known function, the
instruction must be the function entry (12); (4) if the value is
a data address, the address cannot overlap another typed data
unit. GHIDRA’s type inference has no correctness assurance.
Code-to-Code and Code-to-Data Xrefs [ANGR, GHIDRA,
UROBOROS, MCSEMA]: For each constant operand, ANGR,
UROBOROS, and MCSEMA seek to symbolize it as a code
pointer, checking whether the operand refers to a legitimate
instruction. Beyond, GHIDRA has two extra rules: (1) the
operand cannot be a value in {[0-4095], 0xffff, 0xff00,
0xffffff, 0xff0000, 0xff0000, 0xffffffff, 0xffffff00, 0xffff0000,
0xff00000}; (2) the instruction being referred to must be a
function entry (if the function was known) (12). We measured
heuristic 12 with 3,788 binaries. We discover thousands of
pointers to the middle of functions (e.g., pointers for try-catch
in exception handling), showing that heuristic 12 is unsound.
For a constant operand that cannot be a code pointer, the
tools attempt to symbolize it as a data pointer, checking if the
operand refers to a legitimate data location. In the checking
process, ANGR enlarges the boundaries of a data region by
1,024 bytes and GHIDRA adopts a similar idea (13) because
many pointers are dereferenced with an offset. This strategy
indeed benefits coverage (e.g., Listing 6 in Appendix G). It,
however, also introduces errors like Listing 5 in Appendix G.
Recall that GHIDRA leverages xrefs to aid recursive descent
(§ III-A). When a constant operand is symbolized as a xref to a
non-disassembled code region, GHIDRA recursively disassem-
bles that region. If GHIDRA runs into errors like bad opcodes
and invalid control transfers, it rolls back the disassembly.
Address Table [ANGR, GHIDRA, UROBOROS, MCSEMA]:
Beyond constant operands, these tools also symbolize the non-
code regions by locating address tables: a group of consecutive
data units that are pointers. In general, determining address
tables depends on the choice of table size and the rules to
classify a data unit as a pointer. GHIDRA considers 2 as
the minimal size of an address table (14) and the others
consider 1. While the choice of GHIDRA helps more accurately
identify grouped pointers like function tables, it misses many
individual pointers, leading to false negatives. With regard to
determining pointers, all tools follow the approaches as we
previously discussed. After the initial generation of address
tables, ANGR, MCSEMA and GHIDRA also apply refinements:
• ANGR excludes table entries that are floating points ( 4 ).
• MCSEMA excludes table entries that may overlap with a
string ( 15 ). When a piece of data can be both a pointer and
a string, MCSEMA prefers string. As we will discuss below,
ANGR uses an opposite strategy.
• GHIDRA excludes table entries that point to the middle of
recovered functions. GHIDRA also excludes table entries
that overlap with strings or cut into other pointers. Finally,
GHIDRA splits an address table when adjacent entries have
a distance larger than 0xffffff.
• Given an entry to non-disassembled code, GHIDRA expands
the recursive descent using the aforementioned approach.
ANGR uses a special strategy when brute-force searching
data regions. Given a location, ANGR in turn checks whether
the data inside is a pointer, a ASCII/Unicode string, or an
arithmetic sequence. If any type matches, ANGR jumps over
the typed bytes and then resumes the search (16). This strategy
incurs many false negatives like Listing 7 in Appendix G.
Overall, there is a lack of algorithmic solutions to symbol-
ization. Today’s tools incorporate a multitude of heuristics,
striving for a coverage-correctness balance.
C. Algorithms and Heuristics in Function Entry Identification
Most tools use separate strategies to identify the entry of
main versus the entries of other functions. As such, we first
discuss main, followed by the other types of functions.
Main Function [DYNINST, ANGR, BAP, RADARE2]: To
locate it, ANGR and BAP analyze the _start function and,
1 48 c7 c7 e2 e0 40 00 mov $0x40e0e2,%rdi ;main
2 ff 15 ce 48 05 00 ** callq __libc_start_main
Listing 1: Call to __libc_start_main in _start.
following calling conventions, infer the first argument passed
by _start to __libc_start_main ( 5 ). Take Listing 1
as an example. ANGR and BAP locate the instruction at line
1 and deem the immediate operand (0x40e0e2) to be the
address of main. As __libc_start_main is a standard
interface, ANGR and BAP ensure correctness. RADARE2
and DYNINST search architecture-specific patterns near the
call to __libc_start_main to get the address of main
(17). DYNINST finds the instruction right before the call
and extracts the immediate operand; RADARE2 searches the
address after a fixed sequence of raw bytes (e.g., 48 c7 c7 in
Fig. 1). For Windows binaries, RADARE2 seeks a pattern in
__scrt_common_main_seh as it does for Linux binaries
to locate main. Other tools do not particularly find main.
General Functions [DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, BAP,
RADARE2]: To identify the entries of non-main functions,
these tools adopt a hybrid approach that consists of three parts:
(1) The tools seek symbols remaining in the .symtab and
.dynsym sections to determine known-to-be-good functions
( 6 ). (Only) GHIDRA considers the .eh_frame section to
identify functions that have unwinding information ( 7 ). As
mandated by X86-64 ABI, modern compilers (e.g., LLVM and
GCC) keep unwinding information for every function. As we
illustrate in § IV-B3, this way GHIDRA can identify nearly all
function entries, but (surprisingly) it does not use exception
information when handling Windows binaries.
(2) All tools consider targets of direct calls to be function
entries ( 8 ), while ANGR and GHIDRA additionally resolve
certain indirect calls to determine more function entries ( 9 ).
Finally, DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR and RADARE2 include
targets of tail calls as function entries (see § III-D).
(3) All tools use pattern-based approaches to further recover
functions (18). GHIDRA, ANGR and RADARE2 find function
entries based on common prologues (or epilogues); DYNINST
(by default) and BAP find function entries with pre-trained
decision-tree models [9]. As we will present in § IV-B3, this
pattern-based approach is heavily used and indeed identifies
many functions. However, it is very sensitive to architectures,
optimizations, and compiler specifics.
ANGR adopts an extra aggressive approach: during linear
scan over code gaps left by recursive descent, it treats the begin
of each identified code piece as a new entry (19). This method
improves the coverage but incurs many errors (§ IV-B3).
To sum up, the identification of function entry mostly uses
hybrid approaches, mixing algorithms and heuristics.
D. Algorithms and Heuristics in CFG Reconstruction
CFG reconstruction consists of many tasks. We focus on the
challenging ones: resolving indirect jumps/calls, detecting tail
calls, and finding non-returning functions. Direct jumps/calls
are not discussed as they are easily derivable after disassembly.
Indirect Jumps [DYNINST, GHIDRA, ANGR, RADARE2]:
From our benchmark binaries (Table IV), we observed three
types of indirect jumps: (1) jump tables [23] (compiled from
switch-case and if-else statements); (2) indirect tail
calls (indirect calls optimized as tail calls); and (3) hand-
written ones (e.g., longjmp and other cases in Glibc [48]).
cmp/sub $const,%r1
ja default
jmpq *base(,%r2,size)
cmp/sub $const,%r1
ja default
mov base(,%r2,size),%r3
jmpq *%r3
cmp/sub $const,%r1
ja default
lea offset(%rip),%r2
…
mov (%r2,%r3,size),%r4
add %r2, %r4
jmpq *%r4
Type-1 jump table Type-2 jump table Type-3 jump table
less
than
60
bytes
lea $const, %r1
…
cmp/sub $const,%r2
ja default
mov (%r1,%r3,size),%r4
…
jmpq *%r4
Type-4 jump table
Fig. 3: Handling of jump tables by RADARE2.
Jmp target: [rax]
Define target: [(r9 + r8*4) → rax]
Define base: [0x24e4f(rip) → r9]
Define index: [esi → r8d]
Base Guards: [N/A]
Index Guards: [0≤ esi ≤79]
index: = 
default
Base flow: [N/A]
Index flow: [esi → r8d]
Function entry: [N/A]
Base guards: [N/A]
Index guards: [N/A]
Jmp target: [rax]
Memory load: [(r9 + r8*4) → rax]
Find base: [0x24e4f(rip) → r9]
Find index: [r8]
Index slicing: [esi → r8d]
Index bound: [0≤ esi ≤79]
cmp $0x4f,%esi
ja default
lea 0x24e4(%rip),%r9
mov %esi,%r8d
movslq (%r9,%r8,4),%rax
add %r9,%rax
jmpq *%rax
(a) DYNINST
Jmp target: [rax]
Define target: [(r9 + r8*4) → rax]
Define base: [0x24e4f(rip) → r9]
Define index: [esi → r8d]
Base Guards: [N/A]
Index Guards: [0≤ esi ≤79]
index: = 
default
Base flow: [N/A]
Index flow: [esi → r8d]
Function entry: [N/A]
Base guards: [N/A]
Index guards: [N/A]
Jmp target: [rax]
Memory load: [(r9 + r8*4) → rax]
Find base: [0x2 e4f(rip) → r9]
Find index: [r8]
Index slicing: [esi → r8d]
Index bound: [0≤ esi ≤79]
cmp $0x4f,%esi
ja default
lea 0x24e4(%rip),%r9
mov %esi,%r8d
movslq (%r9,%r8,4),%rax
add %r9,%rax
jmpq *%rax
(b) GHIDRA
Fig. 4: Jump table resolution in DYNINST and GHIDRA. The
upper half of Sub-Fig. 4a shows a jump table from Gold
Linker. Lower half of Sub-Fig. 4a and Sub-Fig. 4b respectively
illustrate how DYNINST and GHIDRA resolve the jump table.
RADARE2 only handles jump tables, by searching four types
of patterns shown in Fig. 3 (20). Consider Type-1 jump table as
an example: encountering a jump table of this type, RADARE2
searches an indirect jump in the format of jmp [base +
reg * size] and a cmp/sub instruction in the preceding
basic block. On finding the two items, RADARE2 deems base
as the base address and the constant operand in cmp/sub as
the upper bound of the index. If that upper bound exceeds
512, RADARE2 discards the jump table (21). The strategies
of RADARE2 are highly sensitive to compiling configurations
and are less effective with resolving jump tables (§ IV-B4).
DYNINST also only handles jump tables, using a hybrid
approach shown in Fig. 4a. It performs backward slicing from
the target. In the sliced area, if the first memory read (after
simplification) has the format of [CONST + reg * size]
(20), DYNINST deems the indirect jump to be a jump table,
respectively using CONST and reg as the base address and
index. Starting from the index, DYNINST performs backwards
slicing again up to 50 assignments [35] (22) or the function
entry. In this slice, DYNINST uses a simplified Value Set
Analysis (VSA) to gather value bounds along the flow of the
index (and its aliases) (10).
GHIDRA first considers an indirect jump to be a jump table
and resolves it with a strategy shown in Fig. 4b. In the current
function, GHIDRA seeks a single path that defines both the
base address and the index (20). Along the path, GHIDRA
tracks the propagation of the base and index to identify their
value bounds. Instead of using a full VSA, GHIDRA considers
restrictions by variable types, conditional jumps, and and
instructions. Similar to RADARE2, GHIDRA discards jump
tables with an index bound over 1024 (21). If GHIDRA cannot
resolve the jump table, it will consider the indirect jump as an
indirect call and perform analysis that we will discuss shortly.
ANGR, given an indirect jump, considers the operand as a
source and runs backwards slicing. In the sliced area, ANGR
uses full-scale VSA to identify possible targets (10). However,
the public version of ANGR restricts the slicing to at most three
levels of basic blocks (22), trading utility for efficiency. ANGR
also adopts heuristic 21 with a very large threshold: 100,000.
In summary, tools employ various heuristics to resolve
indirect jumps. These heuristics, mostly derived for accuracy,
introduce fewer errors but have limited coverage (§ IV-B4).
Indirect Calls [GHIDRA, ANGR]: GHIDRA finds targets of
indirect calls based on constant propagation ( 11 ). It tracks
the intra-procedure propagation of constants from immediate
operands, the LEA instructions, and global memory. Once a
constant flows to an indirect call, GHIDRA takes the constant
as a target. ANGR also uses constant propagation ( 11 ) to
handle indirect calls but only considers the current basic block.
Tail Calls [RADARE2, ANGR, DYNINST, GHIDRA]: For ef-
ficiency, function calls at the end of procedures are often
optimized as jumps (i.e., tail calls). Tools adopt different
strategies to detect tail calls.
RADARE2 uses a simple heuristic to determine tail calls:
the distance between a jump and its target exceeding a certain
threshold (23). This heuristic exploits the insight that different
functions are usually apart. However, it is hard to pick a
threshold that is both effective and accurate.
GHIDRA determines a jump as a tail call if the code between
the jump and its target spans multiple functions (24). The
heuristic can lead to both false positives due to discontinuous
functions and false negatives due to unrecognized functions.
GHIDRA further excludes conditional jumps from considera-
tion (25), preventing the detection of 21.6% of the tail calls.
DYNINST takes a sophisticated strategy. It considers a jump
as a tail call if the target is the start of a known function ( 12 ).
Otherwise, DYNINST checks two rules to determine a tail call:
(1) the jump’s target cannot be reached by only following false
branches; (2) right before the jump, the stack is tore down
by [leave; pop $reg] or [add $rsp $const] (26).
While the first rule is hard to reason, the second rule exploits
an intrinsic property of tail calls: the current function recycles
the stack such that the child re-uses its return address. The
above pattern-based approach is less accurate, leading to 97%
of DYNINST’s false positives and most of its false negatives.
ANGR adopts similar strategies as DYNINST. It first identi-
fies jumps whose targets are starts of known functions ( 12 ).
Beyond that, ANGR requires four conditions to detect a tail
call: (1) the jump is unconditional (25); (2) the stack at the
jump is tore down based on stack height analysis (26); (3) the
target does not belong to any function or it belongs to the
current function (27); (4) all incoming edges of the target are
unconditional jumps or direct calls (28). As we will show in
§ IV-B4, these heuristics do not provide correctness guarantees
and each can lead to both false positives and false negatives.
Tools take different strategies to detect tail calls. These
strategies depend critically on function entry detection, in-
heriting inaccuracies from function identification.
Non-returning Functions [ANGR, BAP, RADARE2,
DYNINST, GHIDRA]: Tools use a similar workflow for
detecting non-returning functions. First, they gather the
group of library functions or system calls that are known
to be non-returning (13). Second, from this initial group of
functions, tools further find other ones.
ANGR, RADARE2, and DYNINST use the same idea: they
scan each function and, if no ret instruction is found, they
consider the function to be non-returning (14). However, they
adopt different solutions when encountering a call to a child
function that has unknown returning status: (1) ANGR simply
assumes a fall-through after the call; (2) RADARE2 takes a
similar strategy but when the child status is later updated,
RADARE2 recursively propagates the update to its predecessor
functions; (3) DYNINST takes a depth-first approach to first
handle the successor functions. Only until the status of the
child function is determined, DYNINST will continue handling
the original call. To our understanding, the strategies in
RADARE2 and DYNINST are equivalent. Both are principled
and produce nearly perfect precision (§ IV-B4).
GHIDRA also follows the idea of (14). To handle a call with
unknown returning status, GHIDRA checks the fall-through
code after the call. If the code runs into abnormal regions
(i.e., data, unrecognizable instructions, or another function) or
the code is referenced by xrefs (other than jumps), GHIDRA
marks the fall-through unsafe. If the child function of that call
incurs at least three unsafe fall-through, GHIDRA considers the
child to be non-returning. Further, instead of doing recursive
updates, GHIDRA simply runs the detection process twice.
BAP considers a function to be non-returning if all the
paths in the function end at a call to a non-returning function
(14). To handle calls to child functions with unknown status,
it takes a similar recursive-updating strategy as RADARE2.
Tools use many principled strategies to detect non-returning
functions, ensuring higher correctness.
IV. LARGE-SCALE EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Setup
Benchmarks: We used the software listed in Table IV to
experimentally evaluate the tools we studied. The software
includes programs and libraries of diverse functionality and
complexity, written in C / C++, and containing hand-written
assembly and hard-coded binary code. It also carries a signif-
icant amount of complex constructs as listed in Table XVII,
fitting the use as a benchmark. To test the effect of different
compilers and options, we built each software package for two
operating systems (Linux and Windows), using three compilers
(GCC-8.1.0 and LLVM-6.0.0 on Linux, and Visual Studio
2015 on Windows), various optimization levels (O0, O2, O3,
Os, Ofast on Linux, Od, O1, O2, Ox on Windows), and two
architectures (X86 and X64). This resulted in 3,788 binaries,
TABLE IV: Software used for evaluating tools.
Type Name Programs/Binaries
Linux Windows
Benchmark SPEC CPU2006 30 / 546 15 / 120
Utilities
Unzip-6.0 Coreutils-8.30 7-zip-19
Findutils-4.4 Binutils-2.26 Tiff-4.0
125 / 2500 26 / 196
Clients
Openssl-1.1.0l Putty-0.73 D8-6.4
Filezilla-3.44.2 Busybox-1.31
Protobuf-c-1 ZSH-5.7.1 VIM-8.1
XML2-2.9.8 Openssh-8.0 Git-2.23
13 / 154 13 / 104
Servers
Lighttpd-1.4.54 Mysqld-5.7.27
Nginx-1.15.0 SQLite-3.32.0
3 / 49 2 / 16
Libraries
Glibc-2.27 libpcap-1.9.0 libv8-6.4
libtiff-4.0.10 libxml2-2.9.8
libsqlite-3.32.0 libprotobuf-c-1.3.2
6 / 79 3 / 24
Total 177 / 3328 59 / 460
which are less than the theoretically possible 4484 (177×20
+ 59×16), as some cannot be built for certain configurations.
Ground Truth: We intercept the compiling and linking pro-
cess to automatically obtain ground truth about the produced
binaries, which includes instructions, functions, control trans-
fers, jump tables, xrefs, and remaining complex constructs.
On Linux, we replicate the approach in CCR [60].
CCR extends the LLVM Machine Code layer to record
the needed information in each compiled bitcode/assembly
file. It also instruments the GNU Gold Linker to merge
the information during linking. Throughout experimenta-
tion, we identified several limitation of the CCR linker,
which we addressed by extending it to: (1) collect informa-
tion from previously ignored sections (.text.unlikely,
.text.exit,.text.startup,.text.hot); (2) sup-
port relocatable objects (compiled with -r); (3) record both
the size and the offset of basic blocks; (4) handle linker-
inserted functions (e.g., _start) and statically-linked Glibc
functions; (5) support X86 targets. We also extend the CCR
approach to GCC by instrumenting its RTL pass to label all
related constructs when producing assembly code. We also
customized the GNU Assembler to record the locations of the
constructs and xrefs in the emitted object files. Finally, we
re-use the CCR linker to merge object files.
On Windows, we combine compiler options, symbol/debug
information, and lightweight manual analysis to build ground
truth. Details are covered in Appendix B.
Tools and Configurations: Besides open-source tools, we also
test two commercial tools, IDA PRO-7.4 and BINARY NINJA-
1.2. We detail the configuration of all tools in Appendix C.
It should be noted that we run two versions of GHIDRA and
ANGR, including a version of GHIDRA not using exception
information, namely GHIDRA-NE, and a version of ANGR
without linear scan, namely ANGR-NS.
B. Evaluation Results & Analysis
1) Disassembly : This evaluation measures the recovery of
legitimate instructions. We excluded all the padding bytes and
linker-inserted functions (e.g., _start). We also inserted a
symbol of main so that all recursive tools can find it.
TABLE V: Evaluation results of instruction recovery. L and
W are short for Linux and Windows. Pre and Rec means
precision and recall. Ave/Min show the average/minimal
results among all binaries. The best/worst results specific to
each optimization level are respectively marked as blue/red.
L
Instructions
W
Instructions
Avg Min Avg Min
Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec
O
bj
du
m
p O0 99.98 99.99 88.80 99.70 Od 98.04 99.98 86.84 99.83
O2 99.94 99.94 84.76 99.56 O1 98.96 99.97 83.84 99.84
O3 99.95 99.95 85.84 93.45 O2 97.58 99.97 83.73 99.82
Os 99.95 99.97 84.30 96.45 Ox 97.57 99.97 83.73 99.82
Of 99.90 99.90 86.52 96.65 - - - - -
D
yn
in
st
O0 99.99 99.07 99.90 6.30 - - - - -
O2 99.99 92.45 99.46 4.15 - - - - -
O3 99.99 91.72 99.51 19.47 - - - - -
Os 99.99 89.79 99.83 5.26 - - - - -
Of 99.99 91.65 99.07 19.55 - - - - -
M
cS
em
a O0 99.99 99.99 99.96 99.80 Od 99.79 97.49 94.82 83.20
O2 99.99 99.97 99.88 99.11 O1 99.83 99.32 95.06 97.47
O3 99.99 99.83 99.90 98.64 O2 99.84 95.41 95.81 75.07
Os 99.99 99.99 99.84 99.35 Ox 99.82 96.16 94.18 78.30
Of 99.99 99.83 99.85 96.49 - - - - -
G
hi
dr
a-
N
E O0 99.99 98.03 99.60 63.26 Od 99.88 96.01 94.84 65.05
O2 99.99 80.65 99.64 2.06 O1 99.86 90.40 95.04 73.67
O3 99.99 77.83 99.69 17.77 O2 99.88 92.12 95.80 72.00
Os 99.99 89.66 99.76 12.76 Ox 99.87 92.09 94.10 69.34
Of 99.99 78.48 99.70 17.92 - - - - -
G
hi
dr
a
O0 99.99 99.65 99.96 64.51 Od 99.88 96.01 94.84 65.05
O2 99.99 94.90 99.68 51.31 O1 99.86 90.40 95.04 73.67
O3 99.99 93.63 99.72 48.26 O2 99.88 92.12 95.80 72.00
Os 99.99 95.26 99.73 16.23 Ox 99.87 92.09 94.10 69.34
Of 99.99 93.73 99.73 37.78 - - - - -
A
ng
r-
N
S O0 99.99 98.79 99.96 64.88 Od 99.97 93.02 98.67 14.50
O2 99.99 87.75 99.89 48.75 O1 99.97 93.42 98.10 18.94
O3 99.99 89.00 99.90 54.31 O2 99.96 90.31 98.14 17.80
Os 99.99 94.58 99.94 60.73 Ox 99.96 90.17 98.14 17.80
Of 99.99 88.59 99.87 51.07 - - - - -
A
ng
r
O0 99.99 99.97 99.95 97.64 Od 98.96 99.92 90.01 99.37
O2 99.99 99.98 99.79 99.23 O1 99.33 99.90 87.71 99.16
O3 99.99 99.98 99.81 99.30 O2 98.66 99.88 87.55 99.20
Os 99.99 99.99 99.77 99.78 Ox 98.64 99.88 87.55 99.20
Of 99.98 99.98 99.84 99.75 - - - - -
B
ap
O0 99.99 82.50 99.96 9.37 Od 99.98 71.44 98.97 30.24
O2 99.98 66.88 99.70 9.81 O1 99.96 78.95 98.54 50.87
O3 99.99 65.64 99.69 11.73 O2 99.90 70.49 97.48 42.41
Os 99.98 76.92 97.20 9.16 Ox 99.90 70.47 97.45 38.75
Of 99.94 66.62 95.56 12.64 - - - - -
R
ad
ar
e2
O0 99.98 87.92 94.51 44.59 Od 99.21 86.25 46.59 30.00
O2 99.99 78.80 99.29 8.55 O1 99.82 78.60 92.87 46.21
O3 99.98 75.32 99.24 9.23 O2 98.50 75.78 42.78 44.73
Os 99.97 85.31 91.09 8.59 Ox 98.48 75.60 45.74 38.44
Of 99.99 76.50 99.24 8.90 - - - - -
ID
A
O0 99.99 99.99 99.61 99.34 Od 99.80 99.98 94.83 99.54
O2 99.99 99.95 99.76 98.15 O1 99.82 99.96 95.08 99.39
O3 99.99 99.95 99.87 98.03 O2 99.84 99.89 95.83 96.44
Os 99.99 94.61 99.93 57.31 Ox 99.82 99.90 94.20 96.66
Of 99.99 93.04 99.88 51.62 - - - - -
N
in
ja
O0 99.99 99.81 99.72 89.85 Od 99.61 99.23 94.84 96.61
O2 99.99 98.79 99.50 72.01 O1 99.76 99.74 95.14 96.04
O3 99.98 97.38 99.56 71.77 O2 99.51 98.96 95.93 93.26
Os 99.99 99.46 99.37 77.51 Ox 99.52 99.22 94.32 96.94
Of 99.98 97.49 99.65 71.79 - - - - -
Overall Performance: In Table V, we show the overall results
of instruction recovery. Note that we do not show the results
of PSI and UROBOROS as they are close to OBJDUMP.
In general, the results of disassembly vary across tool
categories. Linear tools and linear-sweep aided tools, like
OBJDUMP and ANGR, have every high coverage (99.95%+ recall).
Recursive tools have lower recovery rates and some can only
recover less than 80% of the instructions (BAP and RADARE2).
We also notice that the performance of recursive tools changes
across optimization levels and architectures. In particular,
nearly all recursive tools (ANGR-NS, GHIDRA-NE, DYNINST, BAP,
RADARE2) have reduced recovery as the optimization increases
and when analyzing X64 targets. This is because that opti-
mization levels and architectures affect the function matching
in recursive tools, further leading to missing of instructions.
Such results well comply with previous observations [5].
In the aspect of precision, we have an opposite observation.
Recursive tools have high precision (over 99.5%), regardless
of the compiler, architecture, and optimization level. Linear
tools are less precise. The precision of OBJDUMP, in the worst
case, drops to around 85%. This difference is mainly because
recursive tools mostly follow the control flow, ensuring cor-
rectness. However, linear tools scan every byte and often run
into errors when data appears in code. For instance, OBJDUMP
produces the worst result in analyzing Openssl (precision:
85.35%) because Openssl has a lot of data in assembly files
and OBJDUMP wrongly identifies the data as code.
Use of Heuristics: To augment the correctness of linear
sweep, PSI introduces error detection and handling. In our
evaluation, PSI can analyze 971 of the X86 binaries on Linux
systems. On the binaries, the linear sweep produces over 10K
errors. PSI captures 26% of the errors leading to bad opcode
and other 6% resulting in invalid control transfers. However,
the public version of PSI has strict requirement of padding
patterns, preventing it from fixing the errors. In summary,
PSI’s heuristic can capture 32% of the errors in linear sweep.
However, we are unable to report the detectable errors due to
PSI’s implementation restrictions.
In contrast, heuristics in recursive tools are mostly for
coverage enhancement. We measure the effectiveness of each
heuristic in turn. We start with pure recursive descent by
disabling function matching, linear scan in ANGR, xref aided
disassembly in GHIDRA and RADARE2. The results are shown
in Table XVIII in Appendix D. Unsurprisingly, all tools have
nearly perfect precision. However, without heuristics, the tools
have very low recall. ANGR, GHIDRA, DYNINST all have a
recall around 51% and RADARE2 recovers no more than 10%
of the code. We noted that GHIDRA still produces high recall
with Linux binaries. This is because GHIDRA uses exception
information to highly accurately identify functions (§ III-C).
On top of pure recursive descent, we in turn enable function
matching, linear scan, and the use of xrefs. With function
matching, recursive tools recover significantly more functions
and code (see Table XIX in Appendix D). In particular, ANGR-
NS and DYNINST respectively identify 21.30% and 18.24%
more functions, leading to recovery of 36.44% and 26.65%
more code (comparing Table V and XVIII). Second, according
to the results of ANGR and ANGR-NS in Table V, linear scan
TABLE VI: Statistics of false positives in instruction recovery.
Pad, data, Func, Non-Ret, Jump-Tbl respectively represent
errors due to padding, data-in-code, wrong function matching,
non-returning functions, and wrong jump tables.
Tools Percentage of False Positives (%)
Pad Data Func Non-Ret Jump-Tbl Other
Objdump 71.7 28.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dyninst 0.0 0.0 36.2 39.9 23.8 0.0
Ghidra 0.0 0.0 18.2 65.4 3.0 13.4
Ghidra-NE 0.0 0.0 6.4 61.7 5.9 26.0
Angr 10.5 10.3 76.3 2.9 0.0 0.0
Angr-NS 0.0 0.0 70.2 29.1 0.7 0.0
Bap 0.0 0.0 89.0 0.8 0.0 10.2
Radare2 0.0 0.0 96.5 2.2 1.3 0.0
aids ANGR to recover 8.20% more instructions. Third, the
use of xrefs in GHIDRA leads to a 4.33% increase in code
coverage, as shown by the result of GHIDRA on Linux binaries
in Table V and XVIII
Understanding of Errors: In Table VI, we summarize the
statistic of false positives. For linear tools (e.g., OBJDUMP), all
the false positives are caused by misidentifying padding bytes
or data-in-code as code. For recursive tools, the most common
reasons of errors include (1) considering illegal locations
as function entries; (2) missing non-returning functions and
assuming the calls to them fall through; (3) incorrect resolution
of jump tables. Beyond that, ANGR’s linear sweep incurs 21%
of the errors due to data in code; BAP and GHIDRA have a
few implementation flaws, also leading to a group of errors.
The reasons of false negatives are consistent. All the false
negatives by linear tools are side-effects of false positives. For
recursive tools, most false negatives are caused by undetected
function: as shown in Table X, recursive tools averagely miss
25.0% of the functions. The remaining instructions are missed
mainly because certain jump tables are not resolved and false
positives over-run the legitimate instructions.
2) Symbolization: In this evaluation, we measure the re-
covery of xrefs. Xrefs in direct jumps/calls are trivial to
identify so we excluded them. We also excluded xrefs in
wrong instructions since such errors are rooted from incorrect
disassembly. Finally, we did not consider jump tables as they
are separately measured in § IV-B4.
Overall Performance: We summarize the overall performance
of symbolization in Table VII. In general, open-source tools
have much higher recovery rates (98.35% on average) than com-
mercial tools (88.63% on average). The difference is even bigger
with the worst case. This is because open-source tools brute
force all constant operands and data units while the commer-
cial tools adopt more conservative strategies. Our hypothesis
can be verified by comparing MCSEMA and IDA PRO, since
MCSEMA just adds a round of brute force on top of IDA PRO.
Somewhat surprisingly, open-source tools also have high
precision (99.92% on average). Based on our observation, the
high precision is because (1) the heuristic-based checks are
generally restrictive and (2) most benchmark programs have
less data. On programs that have more data, the tools are more
inclined to make mistakes (e.g., Mysqld, having plenty of
TABLE VII: Evaluation results of symbolization. UROBOROS
cannot run Linux-Of binaries and all Window binaries. We
also omitted ANGR’s symbolization on Windows binaries as
ANGR’s Reassembler component cannot run them.
L
Symbolizations
W
Symbolizations
Avg Min Avg Min
Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec
*U
ro
bo
O0 99.99 100 99.89 100 - - - - -
O2 100 100 100 100 - - - - -
O3 99.99 100 99.91 100 - - - - -
Os 99.99 100 99.88 100 - - - - -
Of - - - - - - - - -
M
cS
em
a O0 99.99 99.77 99.04 94.05 Od 99.93 96.05 94.79 78.22
O2 99.99 99.96 98.78 97.87 O1 99.96 96.08 98.00 84.80
O3 99.99 99.96 98.88 98.79 O2 99.97 95.38 98.70 86.92
Os 99.98 99.75 98.68 90.91 Ox 99.95 95.51 96.54 83.42
Of 99.96 99.68 93.10 81.82 - - - - -
G
hi
dr
a
O0 99.90 95.70 61.99 45.52 Od 99.70 96.53 94.75 78.12
O2 99.91 95.53 87.35 37.71 O1 99.63 95.02 95.59 77.86
O3 99.92 95.99 88.36 41.60 O2 99.86 95.25 98.67 74.54
Os 99.89 95.37 61.98 41.72 Ox 99.83 95.30 96.45 74.52
Of 99.97 96.26 98.19 20.00 - - - - -
A
ng
r
O0 99.86 99.52 81.74 95.38 - - - - -
O2 99.88 99.54 87.28 95.35 - - - - -
O3 99.90 99.59 88.29 96.21 - - - - -
Os 99.81 99.99 86.57 98.96 - - - - -
Of 99.84 99.99 88.05 98.89 - - - - -
ID
A
O0 99.98 95.96 97.17 36.96 Od 99.99 95.76 99.90 82.51
O2 99.93 94.32 86.77 31.96 O1 99.99 94.11 99.88 72.65
O3 99.94 95.06 88.38 31.96 O2 99.99 94.26 99.88 69.94
Os 99.93 93.81 85.59 25.26 Ox 99.99 94.39 99.89 70.48
Of 99.98 95.63 97.52 32.02 - - - - -
N
in
ja
O0 99.99 79.89 99.81 17.29 Od 99.90 85.37 93.62 40.94
O2 99.99 81.08 97.59 19.01 O1 99.98 84.67 99.61 45.18
O3 99.99 81.38 99.40 21.15 O2 99.98 84.54 99.63 50.17
Os 99.99 77.71 98.67 17.45 Ox 99.97 84.98 99.44 50.14
Of 99.99 82.35 99.52 21.15 - - - - -
data, leads to the lowest precision in many tools).
Use of Heuristics: As shown in Table III, symbolization in-
volves many heuristics, competing for a coverage-correctness
trade-off. Our evaluation shows that heuristic 8 (the brute-force
based approach), 11 (the no-alignment assumption about pointers), and
13 (the enlargement of data regions) bring full coverage of xrefs in
our benchmarks. The other heuristics are instead striving for
correctness. In the following, we discuss them in turn.
Heuristic 8 (the brute-force based approach) is necessary for
symbolization. This can be verified by comparing IDA PRO
and MCSEMA. MCSEMA adds a round of brute force to IDA
PRO, increasing the coverage from 95% to 98%. Heuristic
9 (pointers in data have machine size) is principled if jump tables
are not considered. From over 6 million xrefs, we observe no
violations. Heuristic 10 (pointers in data are aligned) and 11 (pointers
in data may not be aligned) conflict with each other, and neither of
them is perfect. Heuristic 10 misses around 600 xrefs while
heuristic 11 introduces most false positives in ANGR (over
50K). Heuristic 12 (references to code point to function entries) can
reduce false positives but it misses thousands of xrefs to the
middle of functions (e.g., pointers for try-catch in exception
handling). Heuristic 13 (enlarging boundaries of data regions) helps
recover 12K xrefs in data, but leads to 6 and 2K+ false
TABLE VIII: Statistics of false positives in symbolization.
Align, Type, Type-based Sliding, and Extended-data respec-
tively mean no alignment (heuristic 11), ANGR’s moving
scheme (heuristic 16), enlarging data regions (heuristic 13).
Tools Percentage of False Positives (%)
Align Type-based Sliding Extended-data Collision
Urobo* 0.00 0.00 0.00 100
Mcsema 0.00 0.00 0.00 100
Ghidra 0.29 0.00 3.91 95.80
Angr 58.58 4.47 0.01 36.94
TABLE IX: Statistics of false negatives in symbolization.
Align, Type, Extended-data, Function, Address-table respec-
tively mean assumption of alignment (heuristic 10), preferring
strings over pointers (heuristic 15), enlarging data regions
(heuristic 13), and size of address table (heuristic 14).
Tools Percentage of False Negative (%)
Align Type Extended-data Address Table Func
Urobo* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mcsema 1.14 75.22 23.64 0.00 0.00
Ghidra 0.01 3.13 0.00 96.53 0.33
Angr 0.00 100 0.00 0.00 0.00
positives in ANGR and GHIDRA. Heuristic 14 introduces most
false negatives in GHIDRA, although removing a small set of
false positives. Heuristic 15 produces over 3K false negatives
in MCSEMA because the inference of strings is not accurate.
Understanding of Errors: Table VIII shows the statistics of
false positives. Using the assumption that pointers in data can
be non-aligned, ANGR and GHIDRA trigger 59% and 0.3% of
their false positives. They also produce false positives because
they enlarge the boundaries of data regions when checking the
legitimacy of xrefs’ targets. All the other false positives are
due to collisions between numeric values and pointers.
As shown in Table IX, most false negatives by ANGR and
MCSEMA are because they exclude pointers that overlap with
the inferred strings. MCSEMA also misses 23.64% of the xrefs
that point to locations outside of the data regions. GHIDRA,
because of its assumption about the address table’s minimal
size and that code pointers always point to function entries,
respectively produces 96.53% and 0.33% of its false negatives.
3) Function Entry Identification : This evaluation measures
the identification of function entries. In this test, we further
considered NUCLEUS [6] and BYTEWEIGHT [9]. We re-
trained BYTEWEIGHT with our benchmarks binaries.
Overall Performance: Table X presents the overall results.
The key observation is that function entry identification re-
mains a challenge. 4 of the open source tools can only identify
less than 80% of the functions. In particular, RADARE2 has a
recall lower than 66%. Such results indicate, even with heuris-
tics, we have yet to develop better function identification. We
also observe that the results of function identification varies
across optimization levels and architectures. This is because
the tools widely use signature-based function matching, which
are specific to optimizations and architectures. Besides limited
coverage, existing tools also have lower precision in function
TABLE X: Evaluation results of function entry identification.
L
Function Entry
W
Function Entry
Avg Min Avg Min
Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec
D
yn
in
st
O0 99.65 97.11 82.76 2.07 - - - - -
O2 93.92 75.26 48.95 12.37 - - - - -
O3 93.37 74.12 48.95 15.95 - - - - -
Os 98.98 50.46 66.67 4.00 - - - - -
Of 98.70 42.76 50.00 6.25 - - - - -
G
hi
dr
a-
N
E O0 99.92 97.29 94.59 45.30 Od 98.68 83.41 66.42 40.58
O2 99.40 48.46 88.89 10.00 O1 98.45 69.78 61.41 40.62
O3 99.30 47.52 88.89 10.26 O2 98.48 70.00 61.55 40.59
Os 98.85 69.97 77.78 10.50 Ox 98.43 70.93 55.53 40.32
Of 98.32 49.23 81.82 11.02 - - - - -
G
hi
dr
a
O0 99.94 99.66 86.82 55.11 Od 98.68 83.41 66.42 40.58
O2 97.25 87.92 71.92 16.94 O1 98.45 69.78 61.41 40.62
O3 96.48 87.59 71.30 20.00 O2 98.48 70.00 61.55 40.59
Os 99.22 88.90 90.00 12.60 Ox 98.43 70.93 55.53 40.32
Of 95.90 88.31 71.27 20.69 - - - - -
A
ng
r-
N
S O0 97.47 96.92 45.65 60.00 Od 79.19 78.18 27.07 10.63
O2 86.37 68.08 44.74 17.01 O1 77.86 69.36 27.04 10.90
O3 85.23 68.35 42.15 17.00 O2 76.04 66.60 24.03 10.71
Os 89.59 72.36 41.59 19.55 Ox 75.87 66.23 27.56 10.71
Of 84.98 69.99 41.59 16.99 - - - - -
A
ng
r
O0 91.44 98.29 22.13 80.00 Od 20.31 99.47 7.01 94.83
O2 74.67 90.50 8.53 48.38 O1 44.99 99.23 7.01 55.04
O3 74.27 90.35 16.71 45.25 O2 23.21 99.07 10.79 50.78
Os 87.30 97.18 12.45 70.80 Ox 21.05 99.11 6.94 50.77
Of 72.76 90.42 16.90 45.25 - - - - -
B
ap
O0 96.36 85.55 33.59 33.43 Od 88.24 67.14 7.97 30.14
O2 78.62 57.64 3.30 24.47 O1 87.18 59.03 65.54 29.43
O3 77.40 57.22 3.06 24.30 O2 90.68 57.85 74.56 29.94
Os 88.25 65.44 8.78 25.97 Ox 90.62 57.13 74.55 23.71
Of 77.63 58.11 4.75 24.33 - - - - -
R
ad
ar
e2
O0 98.71 97.01 80.01 60.02 Od 97.27 77.74 7.96 30.24
O2 97.39 51.90 20.86 23.99 O1 98.05 64.69 93.08 29.63
O3 97.12 49.66 21.58 23.81 O2 97.26 62.26 92.54 30.02
Os 98.39 71.86 34.64 25.34 Ox 97.45 61.64 93.08 24.53
Of 97.52 51.44 21.87 23.84 - - - - -
ID
A
O0 99.47 92.64 87.34 36.28 Od 99.10 90.45 95.49 61.48
O2 98.50 71.50 53.25 29.74 O1 98.04 83.61 2.35 3.83
O3 98.43 72.49 51.41 29.61 O2 98.85 83.97 95.52 61.47
Os 98.35 81.97 74.39 31.49 Ox 98.86 83.02 95.48 57.79
Of 98.40 78.05 39.93 29.64 - - - - -
N
in
ja
O0 97.24 99.78 38.75 85.88 Od 96.09 99.07 59.66 94.25
O2 93.83 94.55 32.68 69.33 O1 96.29 98.02 2.20 3.83
O3 93.85 95.20 34.65 68.82 O2 96.00 98.45 63.50 82.55
Os 96.40 98.63 39.64 73.38 Ox 95.99 98.83 55.89 94.25
Of 93.74 95.30 36.66 68.83 - - - - -
N
uc
le
us
O0 97.41 98.29 53.58 80.00 Od 88.33 97.63 40.78 94.44
O2 94.99 90.49 48.11 66.79 O1 88.53 96.60 40.78 93.46
O3 95.15 90.76 48.11 66.21 O2 85.34 96.48 40.73 94.00
Os 96.80 91.13 49.86 69.20 Ox 85.53 96.79 40.78 94.26
Of 94.31 90.44 46.53 66.14 - - - - -
B
yt
eW
ei
gh
t O0 99.73 99.35 97.33 97.99 Od 95.62 92.25 49.58 52.43
O2 97.54 96.09 78.15 83.61 O1 95.87 95.78 73.99 63.50
O3 97.94 97.33 77.67 89.91 O2 97.98 96.34 74.81 80.68
Os 97.83 96.86 85.38 76.83 Ox 97.99 95.33 74.23 72.32
Of 97.74 96.82 87.12 84.47 - - - - -
identification, comparing to instruction recovery and symbol-
ization. For instance, ANGR and BAP respectively have an
average precision of 56.67% and 86.11%.
We also notice three other interesting observations. First,
commercial tools do better than open source ones. In partic-
TABLE XI: Statistics of false positives in function detection.
Mismatch, J-Tab, Scan, T-Call, Mis-disa respectively mean
wrong pattern matching, wrong handling of jump tables,
wrong detection of tail calls, and wrong disassembly.
Tools Percentage of False Positives (%)
Mismatch J-Tab Scan T-Call Mis-disa Other
Dyninst 80.80 0.00 0.00 19.20 0.00 0.00
Ghidra 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 99.94
Ghidra-NE 28.38 0.00 0.00 71.61 0.01 0.00
Angr 9.89 0.00 78.41 11.70 0.00 0.00
Angr-NS 92.98 0.00 0.00 7.01 0.01 0.00
Bap 99.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Radare2 6.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 93.17
TABLE XII: Statistics of false negatives in function detection.
J-Tab, T-Call, Non-Ret, and FP-Overlap respectively represent
missing jump table targets, missing tail calls, missing non-
returning functions, and side effects of other false positives.
Tools Percentage of False Negatives (%)
J-Tab T-Call Non-Ret FP-Overlap No-Match
Dyninst 0.03 1.68 2.07 10.16 86.06
Ghidra 0.02 0.05 1.48 12.42 86.03
Ghidra-NE 0.01 0.18 14.16 0.84 84.81
Angr 0.08 13.05 8.25 73.61 5.01
Angr-NS 1.18 1.06 4.01 32.78 60.97
Bap 1.32 2.42 7.99 11.82 76.45
Radare2 1.12 2.78 3.64 5.52 86.94
ular, BINARY NINJA can identify over 97% of the functions
with a precision over 95%. Second, NUCLEUS achieves com-
parable coverage and precision to BINARY NINJA, showing a
high promise of its CFG-connectivity based solution. Based on
an official blog [84], BINARY NINJA incorporates NUCLEUS
for CFG and function detection. Third, BYTEWEIGHT outper-
forms BAP despite BAP internally runs BYTEWEIGHT. This
is because BAP uses pre-trained signatures but BYTEWEIGHT
uses signatures trained with our benchmark binaries.
Use of Heuristics: In function entry identification, two major
heuristics are used. The first heuristic searches function entries
using common prologues/data-mining models. We summarize
the contribution and accuracy of the heuristic in Table XIX in
Appendix D. Without counting functions recursively reachable
from the matched ones, this heuristic recovers 17.36% more
functions with an average precision of 77.53%. Also observ-
able is that utility of this heuristic varies across optimization
levels and architectures. Moreover, existing tools use different
patterns or data-mining models, competing for a coverage-
accuracy trade-off. Comparing to GHIDRA-NE and RADARE2,
ANGR-NS and DYNINST use more aggressive patterns/models,
producing higher coverage (21.3%/24.02 v.s. 18.24%/7.93%) but
lower precision (56.61%/85.37% v.s. 98.42%/87.29%).
The other heuristic, used by ANGR, takes the begin of
each code region detected by linear scan as a function entry.
The heuristic recovers 23% more functions but reduces the
precision by 26.96% because it often considers the begin of
padding or data-in-code as a function entry.
Understanding of Errors: Table XI and XII present the
analysis of false positives and false negative (the analysis of
GHIDRA is only done on binaries with exception information).
For false positives, there are three common causes. First,
the signature-based detection wrongly matches function entries
(FP ratio - DYNINST: 80.80%, GHIDRA-NE: 28.38%, ANGR-NS: 92.98%,
BAP: 99.99%). Second, inaccurate tail call detection takes target
of a regular jump as a function entry (FP ratio - DYNINST: 19.20%,
GHIDRA-NE: 71.61, ANGR: 11.70%). Third, incorrect disassembly re-
sults in erroneous call instructions to incorrect target functions
(FP ratio - GHIDRA-NE: 0.01%, ANGR-NS: 0.01%, RADARE2: 0.01%).
Beyond the three causes, ANGR produces 78.41% of its false
positives because it considers code discovered by its linear
scan as a function entry; GHIDRA generates 99.94% of its false
positives because exception information also carries pointers
to middle of functions; RADARE2, aggressively inferring code
pointers based on xrefs, brings 93.17% of its false positives.
False negatives also have a group of similar causes. First,
tools can miss targets of jump tables and fail to identify
functions called by the target code or their successors (FN
ratio - ANGR-NS: 1.18%, BAP: 1.32%, RADARE2: 1.12%). Jump tables
have smaller impacts to ANGR and DYNINST because ANGR
uses linear scan to compensate jump tables and DYNINST has
high coverage of jump tables. Second, tools cannot recognize
many tail calls and hence, miss the functions indicated by their
targets (FN ratio - ANGR: 13.05%, BAP: 2.42%, RADARE2: 2.78%).
Third, missed non-returning functions prevent the detection of
many function entries in cases like Listing 8 in Appendix G
(FN ratio - GHIDRA-NE: 14.16%, ANGR: 8.25%, ANGR-NS: 4.01%, BAP:
7.99%). Fourth, wrongly identified functions can over-lap with
true functions, making the true ones un-recognizable (FN ratio
- DYNINST: 10.16%, GHIDRA: 12.42%, ANGR: 73.61%, ANGR-NS: 32.78%).
All the other functions are missed because they are neither
reached by recursive descent nor matched by patterns (FN
ratio - ANGR-NS: 60.97%, GHIDRA: 86.03%, RADARE2: 86.94%).
4) CFG Reconstruction : In this part, we measure 5 targets:
(1) intra-procedure edges between basic blocks; (2) call graphs
for direct calls; (3) indirect jumps and indirect calls; (4) tails
calls; (5) non-returning functions. For task (1), we exclude the
edge between a call and the fall through code. For jump tables
in task (3), we consider a case with no targets resolved as a
false negative. All other cases are counted as false positives.
For task (4), we exclude recursive calls and we count unique
target functions instead of jumps.
Overall Performance: Table XIII and XIV show the results of
CFG reconstruction on Linux binaries and Windows binaries.
First, the tools can recover most of the edges with high
accuracy. DYNINST, GHIDRA, and ANGR find over 90% of
the edges with an accuracy higher than 95%. Moreover, the
recovery of edges highly correlates to the recovery of instruc-
tions: precision and recall in the two tasks are consistent. The
results of call graphs are similar to, so we omit the details.
Second, tools have different capabilities of handling jump
tables. On average, GHIDRA and DYNINST can resolve over
93% of the jump tables with an accuracy of around 90%.
RADARE2 and ANGR have a similar coverage rate (around 75%)
while ANGR has much higher accuracy (96.27% v.s. 90%). In
TABLE XIII: Results of CFG reconstruction on Linux. Edge,
CG, T-Call, N-Ret, and J-Tab respectively mean edges, call
graphs, tail calls, non-returning functions, and jump tables.
L Edge CG T-Call N-Ret J-Tab
Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec
D
yn
in
st
O0 97.28 97.10 99.99 99.01 81.91 71.15 100.0 86.89 99.97 98.82
O2 98.61 92.41 99.99 91.17 68.75 78.84 100.0 86.04 99.87 99.05
O3 98.88 91.58 99.99 90.34 59.64 71.12 100.0 86.20 99.81 99.10
Os 98.93 90.14 99.99 86.92 67.74 68.79 100.0 86.33 99.89 98.50
Of 98.87 91.33 99.99 90.26 58.93 68.60 100.0 85.08 99.93 98.75
G
hi
dr
a
O0 99.63 97.41 99.99 96.66 90.98 79.42 100.0 50.19 98.49 75.58
O2 99.89 89.61 99.99 88.91 95.93 97.91 99.98 71.21 97.46 97.55
O3 99.89 89.30 99.99 88.59 92.75 96.10 100.0 67.15 91.44 97.71
Os 99.88 90.12 99.99 88.88 99.01 99.02 100.0 59.74 99.03 91.53
Of 99.90 89.47 99.99 88.37 92.65 94.74 100.0 69.59 91.70 97.81
A
ng
r
O0 98.41 98.13 99.99 99.93 34.09 57.80 97.62 81.25 99.80 87.34
O2 94.88 94.95 99.99 99.98 91.20 77.46 89.57 80.48 89.21 70.07
O3 95.23 95.16 99.99 99.98 87.46 80.97 90.48 80.72 89.12 73.42
Os 95.53 96.44 99.99 99.95 84.37 96.05 93.04 83.05 98.62 81.07
Of 95.12 95.10 99.99 99.95 87.34 79.13 88.98 78.28 90.23 73.22
B
ap
O0 95.31 76.12 99.99 85.00 - - 100.0 75.61 - -
O2 91.76 55.48 99.99 78.05 - - 99.18 76.66 - -
O3 92.00 55.97 99.99 77.69 - - 99.12 71.40 - -
Os 94.03 72.00 99.99 80.42 - - 100.0 79.37 - -
Of 91.95 56.54 99.99 77.84 - - 99.24 68.66 - -
R
ad
ar
e2
O0 98.47 83.29 99.99 92.67 - - 83.45 83.51 55.74 43.14
O2 98.07 85.75 99.99 81.02 - - 96.93 79.80 98.11 97.78
O3 98.23 83.09 99.99 76.96 - - 96.85 79.25 98.52 98.11
Os 98.67 80.01 99.99 86.99 - - 96.63 79.56 82.53 76.24
Of 98.42 86.97 99.99 77.79 - - 97.03 76.25 98.51 97.26
ID
A
O0 99.38 97.39 99.99 97.60 93.05 90.82 100.0 89.18 99.95 99.99
O2 99.32 92.74 99.99 90.35 72.57 87.79 100.0 89.32 99.88 99.59
O3 99.36 92.88 99.99 89.89 93.65 92.74 100.0 89.11 99.89 99.71
Os 99.34 95.78 99.99 95.12 75.62 85.83 99.98 90.67 99.61 99.92
Of 99.33 93.99 99.99 92.07 73.62 81.82 100.0 87.86 99.68 99.75
N
in
ja
O0 99.99 99.46 99.99 99.75 54.98 87.69 100.0 86.28 99.60 99.30
O2 99.32 98.27 99.99 99.27 83.14 94.85 100.0 86.78 98.91 95.81
O3 99.20 94.97 99.99 98.89 84.18 93.37 100.0 86.84 98.67 89.87
Os 99.58 99.05 99.99 99.55 87.24 96.91 100.0 90.13 99.02 96.36
Of 99.39 95.87 99.99 98.85 84.79 90.93 100.0 86.65 98.77 90.26
comparison to open-source tools, commercial tools have both
higher coverage (96.5% v.s. 84.8%) and accuracy (99% v.s. 92.96%).
Besides jump tables, there are two more types of indirect
jumps: handle-written assembly code (336 cases like [48]) and
indirect tail calls (35,087 cases). For the first type, GHIDRA,
by analysing constant propagation, resolves 96 cases but only
report one target in each case. BINARY NINJA generates results
for 120 cases, however, with incorrect targets.
Third, ANGR, GHIDRA, IDA PRO, and BINARY NINJA have
(limited) supports of indirect calls. ANGR resolves 43 cases
but only reports one target in each case. Our manual analysis
verified the targets are correct, all following the pattern of
[mov/lea CONST, reg; ...; call reg]. GHIDRA
finds an incomplete set of targets for 88,078 indirect calls (only
one target for 87,947 cases). IDA PRO reports results for 15,325
indirect calls (only one target for 15,267 cases). The other 58 cases
follow the format of Listing 9 in Appendix G, which are fully
solved by IDA PRO. BINARY NINJA reports targets for 3,410
indirect calls (1 target for 92 cases; 2 targets for 1,865 cases; 3 targets for
469 cases; 4 targets for 889 targets; 4+ targets for 95 cases).
Fourth, existing tools are not perfect with detecting tail
TABLE XIV: Results of CFG reconstruction on Windows.
W Edge CG T-Call N-Ret J-Tab
Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec
G
hi
dr
a Od 96.66 87.09 99.88 90.84 88.50 80.92 100.0 11.23 70.84 95.46
O1 98.15 82.78 99.91 85.24 85.64 88.41 100.0 7.37 77.30 97.79
O2 96.58 83.80 99.86 87.61 83.03 85.65 99.44 7.56 72.89 94.62
Ox 96.56 84.19 99.83 88.48 83.44 87.85 99.44 7.51 72.91 94.96
A
ng
r Od 95.33 96.86 99.87 99.99 55.33 80.21 93.14 16.40 99.65 71.22O1 96.43 97.80 99.89 99.99 97.30 91.87 96.67 35.85 99.82 73.65
O2 95.72 96.13 99.88 99.98 97.48 92.52 97.04 41.41 99.99 59.71
Ox 95.58 96.12 99.86 99.98 96.61 92.48 97.11 42.05 99.99 60.03
B
ap
Od 96.05 70.89 99.29 73.92 - - 0.00 0.00 - -
O1 97.00 80.00 99.99 80.87 - - 100.0 1.52 - -
O2 96.43 70.22 99.99 72.59 - - 100.0 6.64 - -
Ox 96.40 72.77 99.99 69.23 - - 100.0 6.16 - -
R
ad
ar
e2 Od 97.74 85.12 99.11 86.83 - - 100.0 6.30 96.24 84.29
O1 98.97 80.03 99.90 81.14 - - 100.0 6.43 88.89 71.56
O2 98.07 79.59 99.91 80.79 - - 100.0 6.56 95.29 64.49
Ox 98.03 80.71 99.90 81.26 - - 100.0 6.55 95.16 64.03
ID
A
Od 96.98 95.77 99.87 98.00 96.25 77.06 100.0 53.89 99.43 100.0
O1 98.36 95.79 99.87 97.41 90.95 81.80 100.0 58.09 99.66 99.81
O2 97.12 93.92 99.85 97.07 88.18 83.34 100.0 63.38 99.91 99.85
Ox 97.11 93.73 99.84 96.88 88.32 81.99 100.0 63.19 99.66 99.81
N
in
ja
Od 98.63 97.39 99.90 99.75 84.89 80.37 100.0 38.66 96.97 93.09
O1 99.20 98.60 99.80 99.83 95.31 91.89 100.0 47.30 99.61 90.22
O2 98.59 96.63 99.88 98.93 95.49 92.76 100.0 48.67 96.49 91.49
Ox 98.59 96.82 99.86 99.10 95.61 92.83 100.0 48.43 96.50 91.55
calls. The recovery rate ranges from 71.7% (DYNINST) to
91.28% (BINARY NINJA); the precision varies from 67.39%
(DYNINST) to 90.21% (GHIDRA). We observe that many tools
(ANGR, GHIDRA, BINARY NINJA) has the lowest precision
with optimization disabled. This is because less tail calls are
emitted at lower optimization levels and a few false positives
can result in a low precision.
Finally, tools can detect non-returning functions with very
high precision (nearly 100% for many tools). However, they
have limited coverage, especially on Windows binaries. Based
on our analysis, the root cause of the low coverage is incom-
plete collection of non-returning library functions.
Use of Heuristics: The recovery of edges and call graphs
share heuristics in disassembly so we omit the details.
The resolving of jump tables uses three heuristics. First,
RADARE2, GHIDRA, and DYNINST use patterns to detect
jump tables, identifying 85.53%, 98.01%, and 99.56% of all
jump tables. Second, DYNINST and ANGR restrict the scope
of slicing in VSA, missing the index bound in many jump
tables. By enlarging the scope of slicing to 500 assignments
in DYNINST and 10 basic blocks in ANGR, the two tools find
the index bound in 2.1% and 19.8% more jump tables. Third,
GHIDRA and RADARE2 discard jump tables with index over
1,024 and 512, respectively missing 51 and 2,435 jump tables.
To detect tail calls, RADARE2 relies on the distance between
jumps and their targets. It is hard to pick a proper threshold:
in our benchmark binaries, the distance for regular jumps (min:
0; max: 0xb5867) and tail calls (min: 0; max: 0xb507c5) are largely
overlapped. GHIDRA uses the heuristic that a tail call and
its target spans multiple functions. This heuristic is general
to capture tail calls, producing a high coverage of 91.29%.
However, it cannot recognize regular jumps between two
TABLE XV: Statistics of false positives in CFG-edge recovery.
Non-Ret, Func, T-Call, Inst, No-split, Jump-Tab respectively
represent undetected non-returning functions, unrecognized
functions, unidentified tail calls, wrong instructions, missing
edges to middle of basic blocks, and wrong jump table targets.
Tools Percentage of False Positives (%)
Non-Ret Func T-Call Inst No-split J-Tab
Dyninst 23.09 12.25 23.28 4.95 35.24 1.19
Ghidra 8.76 1.88 13.00 0.11 75.13 1.12
Angr 16.69 38.42 10.82 4.73 27.02 2.32
Bap 37.95 22.30 1.34 0.34 38.06 0
Radare2 73.32 3.90 15.55 0.67 4.23 2.34
parts of non-continuous functions, producing over 70K false
positives. ANGR and DYNINST use control-flow and stack-
height based heuristics, detecting 4.24% and 6.99% more tail
calls. However, the heuristics are neither sound nor complete,
producing both false negatives and false positives.
Understanding of Errors: Table XV presents the analysis
of false positives in edge recovery. The false negatives of
edge recovery are mostly caused by non-recovered instructions
(see § IV-B1). We omit the details. For call graphs, the false
positives and false negatives are generally side effects of errors
in disassembly. Details are also discussed in § IV-B1.
The errors related to jump tables are case specific and
tool specific. We randomly sample 10% false negatives and
10% false positives from each tool and do manual analysis
to understand the reasons. The false negatives vary across
tools. RADARE2, GHIDRA, and DYNINST rely on patterns
to detect jump tables, leading to 64.1%, 31.4%, and 37.72%
of their false negatives. Further, RADARE2 incurs 35.9% of
its false negatives because it discards jump tables with over
512 entries; GHIDRA produces 62.63%, 5.50%, and 0.47% of
its false negatives, respectively because it does not consider
sub instructions in VSA analysis, does not capture the correct
restrictions to the index, and discards jump tables with more
than 1,024 entries; ANGR generates false negatives because of
no VSA results (67.86%), wrong VSA results leading to over
100,000 entries (14.29%), and no handling of sbb instructions
(17.86%); DYNINST’s remaining false negatives are caused
by its restriction of slicing scope (2.1%) and no handling
of get_pc_thunk (60.18%). Beyond the above reasons, we
also observe 6 cases where the index is unrestricted (e.g.,
Listing 10), leading to false negatives in many tools. The
causes of false positives are also diverse. RADARE2’s false
positives are mostly because it matches the wrong cmp/sub
instruction (54.29%) or the restriction to the index is not by
cmp/sub (45.71%). DYNINST produces false positives because
it does not handle special aliases of the index (78.96%), does not
consider restrictions by type (17.95%), and restricts the scope
of slicing (3.09%). ANGR incurs false positives due to incorrect
VSA solving (78.26%) and ignoring certain paths in slicing
(21.74%). With GHIDRA, the false positives are because of
wrongly considering indirect jumps as indirect calls (55.32%),
no consideration of sub instruction in VSA analysis (34.04%),
identifying extra/wrong restrictions to the index (4.26%), and
TABLE XVI: Statistics of false negatives in detection of
non-returning functions. Lib, Cond-NonRet, Exit-Inst, Fake-
Ret, Propa respectively stand for unrecognized non-returning
library functions, argument-dependent non-returning functions
(e.g., error), instructions that exit (e.g., ud2), functions
that contain ret instructions but do not actually return, and
propagation of other types of false negatives.
Tools Percentage of False Negatives (%)
Lib Cond-NonRet Exit-Inst Fake-Ret Propa
Dyninst 12.30 43.86 0.30 27.64 15.90
Ghidra 3.97 13.01 0.04 9.54 73.44
Angr 19.08 21.70 0.00 22.29 36.93
Bap 24.45 22.73 0.10 28.90 23.82
Radare2 19.89 26.04 0.08 13.07 40.92
including the default case as an entry (6.38%).
In detecting tail calls, false negatives are largely caused
by excluding conditional jumps (FN ratio - GHIDRA: 21.6%;
ANGR 17.5%), missing boundaries between adjacent functions
(FN ratio - GHIDRA: 78.4%), excluding targets reached by both
conditional jumps and unconditional jumps (FN ratio - ANGR:
81.6%), incorrect calculation of stack height (FN ratio - ANGR:
0.9%), unrecognized functions and no stack adjustment patterns
before the jumps (FN ratio - DYNINST:100%). For false posi-
tives, the most common cause is wrong function entries (FP
ratio - GHIDRA: 5.9%; ANGR 19.7%; DYNINST: 2.4%). Other reasons
include non-continuous functions (FP ratio - GHIDRA: 94.1%;
ANGR 0.3%; DYNINST: 0.6%), instructions follow the format of
add esp/rsp, CONST but do not tear down the stack (FP
ratio - DYNINST:97%), unchanged stack height before the jump
(FP ratio - ANGR: nearly 90%). We also notice that ANGR’s false
positives contain a group of conditional jumps, which are
caused by a defect in its code.
Table XVI shows the false negatives in detecting non-
returning functions. A special category is functions that have
ret instructions but do not return (e.g., _Unwind_Resume
in Glibc). Such functions alter the stack to use a self-prepared
return address, avoiding returning to the parent. We observe
no false positives with DYNINST. RADARE2 generates false
positives because of un-handled jump tables (23.40%), wrong
function boundaries (4.26%), and propagation of other false
positives (72.34%). ANGR produces false positives due to un-
handled jump tables/tail calls (29.73%), wrong function bound-
aries (54.05%), and propagation of other false positives (16.22%).
GHIDRA incurs all its false positives due to heuristic 29 . False
positives by BAP are due to implementation issues.
C. Threats to Completeness and Validity
Despite our best efforts to carefully evaluate the public
versions of the selected tools, there could still be threats to the
completeness and validity of our results. Completeness wise,
we may have missed reporting the results of some tools in
certain tasks due to implementation issues of the tools (other
than fundamental limitations). For instance, we could not
report Angr’s results of symbolization with Windows binaries
because of two implementation issues in Angr’s Reassembler
module (one is reported at https://github.com/angr/angr/issues/
1998; the other one is because Reassembler tries to parses the
PLT section that does not exist in Windows binaries). Validity
wise, implementation issues in our evaluation and analysis
code may have slipped into the results, leading to inaccurate
reports of the tools’ performance. To mitigate this threat, we
checked if the evaluation results match our understanding of
the tools. In particular, we checked if the false positives and
false negatives were explainable by the tool’s strategies.
V. FINDINGS
This study uncovered the following major findings.
F-1: Complex constructs are common and heuristics are
indispensable to handle them. We observe a large amount of
complex constructs in our benchmarks (Table XVII). In partic-
ular, we found 295 instances of data-in-code, complementary
to previous research [5]. Heuristics are indispensable to handle
the constructs: they are responsible for 49% of the instructions,
17% of the function entries, and most xrefs.
F-2: Heuristics inherently introduce coverage-correctness
trade-offs. Heuristics significantly increase coverage, but con-
currently induce new errors. As a counter-movement, new
heuristics are devised to reduce the errors, leading to coverage-
correctness trade-offs in nearly every disassembly phase.
F-3: Tools complement each other. As shown in Table III, ex-
isting tools use heuristics and algorithms that have overlaps but
also many differences. This features tools different strengths,
indicating that tool selection should be demand-specific.
F-4: Broader and deeper evaluation is needed for future
improvements. We envision that the community may have
insufficiently evaluated existing tools. This prevents compre-
hensive understanding about the limitations of the tools. We
hope our study will bring a piece of basis to broaden and
deepen the evaluation towards better binary disassembly.
VI. CONCLUSION
We present a systematization of binary disassembly with
a thorough study and comprehensive evaluation, centering
around the perspective of algorithms and heuristics. Our study,
via the comprehension on the source code of 9 disassembly
tools, presents in-depth understanding of their strategies. Our
evaluation separately measures the tools on each disassem-
bly phase and on individual strategies, which fully unveils
how much the heuristics are used, how much the heuristics
contribute to disassembly, and what errors the heuristics can
introduce. Throughout the study, we derive a group of new
observations that can amend/complement previous understand-
ings and also inspire future directions of binary disassembly.
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APPENDIX
TABLE XVII: Statistics of complex constructs in our bench-
mark binaries.
Complex Constructs Types Cases / Prog / Bin
Data in code
Padding bytes 6,445,649 / 236 / 3,788
Hard-coded bytes 295 / 3 / 18
Jump tables 21,586 / 57 / 426
Indirect Jumps
Jump tables 118,616 / 225 / 3,594
Indirect tail-calls 35,087 / 26 / 465
Handle-written ones 336 / 1 / 4
Special functions
Overlapping functions 2,050 / 6 / 49
Multi-entry functions 103 / 3 / 11
Non-return functions 29,668 / 228 / 3,712
(Direct) Tail-calls N/A 503,527 / 236 / 3,781
A. Complex Constructs
Table XVII presents the statistics of complex constructs
from our benchmark binaries.
B. Building Ground Truth for Windows Binaries
First, we follow a similar approach as described in [5] to
gather instructions. We use the line table in debug information
to find the first instruction of each source-code/assembly state-
ment, followed by recursive disassembly (skipping indirect
control transfers) to find instructions not covered by the line
table. We also found that Visual Studio considers hard-coded
bytes as code in the line table. We manually exclude such
cases. Second, we rely on symbols to identify functions. The
symbol of a function also carries a flag indicating whether it
returns, aiding us to gather non-returning functions. Third, we
enable the DEBUGTYPE:FIXUP option in Visual Studio such
that all xrefs are preserved in the linking process. Finally, we
identify jump tables based on xrefs (which contain the base
address and entries of a jump table). For each xref, if its target
location contains a list of other xrefs pointing to basic blocks
in the same function, we consider the xref refers to a jump
table and deem the list of xrefs at its target location as entries.
For correctness, we further verify if the jump table entries
correspond to switch-cases in the source code. Otherwise,
we manually verify the correctness (since some jump tables
are hand-crafted or compiled from if-else statements).
Our initial ground truth of non-returning functions (for both
Linux and Windows binaries) can miss propagated cases. To
this end, we expand our ground truth by running algorithms
14 and 15 with recursive updates.
C. Configurations of Disassembly Tools
OBJDUMP, PSI, UROBOROS: We use the recommended
options to run them. We parse their outputs for results.
DYNINST: We use its ParseAPI interface to perform recursive
disassembly and we further enable IdiomMatching to include
the decision-tree based function matching (which is excluded
when we do testing without heuristics). We parse the returned
structure of ParseAPI to get the disassembly results.
ANGR: We use its CFGFast interface for disassembly.
When using this interface, we enable the normalize and
detect tail calls arguments so that a basic block is split by
a control transfer to the middle and tail calls are detected.
When testing disassembly without heuristics, we disable the
force complete scan and function prologues arguments to
CFGFast, preventing linear scan and function matching. To
obtain the results, we interpret the CFG returned by CFGFast
for results. We also excluded functions marked as “alignment”.
We use the Reassembler interface for symbolization.
GHIDRA: Besides default settings, we enable Assume Con-
tiguous Functions Only and Allow Conditional Jumps to per-
form tail call detection. We disable the X86 Constant Reference
Analyzer in symbolization as it introduces many dummy
xrefs. Finally, to test GHIDRA without heuristics, we disable
Function Start Search and xrefs related options, to prevent the
signature-based matching and xref based disassembly.
TABLE XVIII: Results of disassembly without heuristics.
L
Instructions
W
Instructions
Avg Min Avg Min
Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec
D
yn
in
st
O0 99.99 66.30 99.97 1.20 - - - - -
O2 99.99 66.44 99.91 1.19 - - - - -
O3 99.99 63.79 99.91 1.11 - - - - -
Os 99.99 68.58 99.96 1.31 - - - - -
Of 99.99 66.35 99.78 1.11 - - - - -
G
hi
dr
a-
N
E O0 99.99 64.53 99.90 1.22 Od 99.87 53.34 93.66 2.26
O2 99.99 69.97 99.62 1.13 O1 99.87 53.58 94.66 2.61
O3 99.99 63.28 99.63 1.21 O2 99.87 53.24 95.32 2.15
Os 99.99 68.53 99.77 1.35 Ox 99.86 52.91 93.56 2.15
Of 99.99 64.67 99.64 1.27 - - - - -
G
hi
dr
a
O0 99.99 91.03 99.96 14.08 Od 99.87 53.34 93.66 2.26
O2 99.99 91.75 99.68 1.80 O1 99.87 53.58 94.66 2.61
O3 99.99 90.18 99.72 1.95 O2 99.87 53.24 95.32 2.15
Os 99.99 93.59 99.94 19.49 Ox 99.86 52.91 93.56 2.15
Of 99.99 88.93 99.73 21.16 - - - - -
A
ng
r-
N
S O0 99.99 65.78 99.99 1.21 Od 99.99 47.21 99.99 2.16
O2 99.99 58.13 99.74 0.61 O1 99.99 51.38 99.98 2.51
O3 99.99 58.62 99.94 0.54 O2 99.99 46.32 99.99 2.06
Os 99.99 64.14 96.46 0.80 Ox 99.99 45.98 99.98 2.06
Of 99.99 60.14 97.25 0.55 - - - - -
R
ad
ar
e2
O0 99.99 6.37 99.99 0.02 Od 99.99 2.88 99.96 0.03
O2 99.99 11.87 99.99 0.02 O1 99.99 3.69 99.99 0.04
O3 99.99 12.03 99.99 0.01 O2 99.99 4.49 99.92 0.03
Os 99.86 7.29 83.70 0.01 Ox 99.99 4.14 99.83 0.03
Of 99.87 7.94 79.25 0.01 - - - - -
TABLE XIX: Results of function-matching. The baseline of
Rec is the total number of true functions.
L
Function Matching
W
Function Matching
Avg Min Avg Min
Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec Pre Rec
D
yn
in
st
O0 97.56 45.64 50.00 0.99 - - - - -
O2 83.84 33.30 17.24 0.72 - - - - -
O3 83.08 33.88 19.35 0.64 - - - - -
Os 89.11 4.88 0.00 0.00 - - - - -
Of 73.24 2.39 0.00 0.00 - - - - -
G
hi
dr
a-
N
E O0 97.26 42.43 0.00 0.00 Od 99.78 30.32 94.42 3.00
O2 97.29 3.48 0.00 0.00 O1 99.62 18.38 86.78 1.78
O3 97.09 4.42 0.00 0.00 O2 99.68 20.98 93.58 0.92
Os 97.69 16.55 0.00 0.00 Ox 99.69 23.08 93.58 0.89
Of 97.72 4.49 0.00 0.00 - - - - -
A
ng
r-
N
S O0 91.04 36.93 0.00 0.00 Od 45.65 17.35 1.04 0.16
O2 53.02 19.20 0.00 0.00 O1 51.90 12.95 2.60 0.16
O3 54.97 21.12 0.00 0.00 O2 47.56 12.60 6.34 0.50
Os 59.15 26.16 0.00 0.00 Ox 47.93 13.36 6.86 0.50
Of 58.26 22.03 0.00 0.00 - - - - -
B
ap
O0 89.10 31.67 5.68 1.78 Od 57.94 12.78 1.16 0.23
O2 54.21 16.23 0.00 0.00 O1 50.45 7.57 1.11 0.23
O3 55.03 18.21 0.00 0.00 O2 55.54 8.97 1.28 0.25
Os 66.83 16.18 0.00 0.00 Ox 55.58 8.40 1.16 0.23
Of 54.75 17.91 1.41 1.03 - - - - -
R
ad
ar
e2
O0 99.86 30.66 66.66 0.00 Od 77.36 14.83 0.00 0.00
O2 97.19 0.46 50.00 0.00 O1 74.53 7.30 0.00 0.00
O3 97.15 0.37 50.00 0.00 O2 71.80 5.24 0.00 0.00
Os 97.86 6.30 50.00 0.00 Ox 71.80 5.58 0.00 0.00
Of 98.05 0.60 58.33 0.00 - - - - -
RADARE2: We run RADARE2 with four options: aa for
default recursive disassembly, aanr for non-return function
detection, aac and aap respectively enable xref based disas-
sembly and signature-based function matching. With aac and
aap disabled, we can test RADARE2 without heuristics. We
use APIs provided by RADARE2 to obtain the results.
BAP: We run BAP with -dasm and -drcfg to do disassembly
and reconstruct the CFG. Note the plugin for -drcfg needs extra
installation. We use the with-no-return [27] pass to detect
non-returning function. We parse BAP’s outputs for results.
IDA PRO, BINARY NINJA: We run the two tools with
default settings and use their public APIs to get the results.
D. Breakdown Analysis of Heuristics
Table XVIII and XIX respectively show the results of
instruction recovery without heuristics and the results of
pattern-based function matching.
E. Overlap of False Positives and False Negatives
TABLE XX: Overlap of FP and FN in disassembly.
Type Number of Appearance (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
FP 92.05 4.11 2.52 0.85 0.31 0.14 0.01 0.001
FN 83.08 14.16 2.36 0.34 0.04 0.01 0.0005 0
TABLE XXI: Overlap of FP and FN in symbolization.
Type Number of Appearance (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6
FP 95.30 4.70 0.03 0.001 0.00 0.00
FN 85.60 5.40 9.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
TABLE XXII: Overlap of FP and FN in function detection.
Type Number of Appearance (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FP 70.4 19.2 2.5 8.6 1.5 0.2 0.05 0.007 0.01 0.007
FN 32.9 8.1 4.1 7.3 14.7 14.5 7.8 5.6 3.2 1.7
TABLE XXIII: Overlap of FP and FN in CFG recovery.
Type Number of Appearance (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FP (EDGE) 75.2 14.8 4.6 2.5 2.2 0.4 0.2
FN (EDGE) 43.0 22.3 14.3 10.1 4.8 3.7 1.7
FP (CG) 99.9 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0
FN (CG) 54.4 20.5 14.8 7.9 2.1 0.2 0.001
FP (T-Call) 91.3 7.9 0.7 0.03 0.0001 0 0
FN (T-Call) 61.1 29.5 7.1 0.9 1.4 0 0
FP (Non-Ret) 98.0 2.0 0 0 0 0 0
FN (Non-Ret) 48.5 20.7 8.3 7.0 6.0 3.4 6.2
FP (J-Tab) 74.8 17.1 6.1 1.9 0 0 0
FN (J-Tab) 44.8 36.7 12.9 4.5 1.1 0.01 0
In Table XX, XXI, XXII, and XXIII, we present the
overlap of false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN) in
different tasks. Each cell indicates the percentage of FPs/FNs
produced by the number of tools specified by Number of
Appearance (e.g., the value (2.36%) in the cell [FN, 3] in
Table XX means 2.36% of the FNs are produced by 3 tools).
F. Understanding of Commercial Tools
We attempted to infer how IDA PRO and BINARY NINJA
operate, based on empirical experiments, blogs [49, 76, 84],
documentations [1], and communications with the developers.
Disassembly: Both IDA PRO and BINARY NINJA perform
recursive descent to recover instructions. We inferred this
based on their correct results of handling Listing 2 and [84].
They also take other approaches to handling code gaps.
BINARY NINJA follows a heuristic as described in [84] to
deal with code gaps. It linearly scans non-disassembled code
regions and aggregates call targets. Once done, BINARY NINJA
sorts all the targets based on the times of being referenced and
(in order) hands them off to further recursive descent.
IDA PRO at least uses four strategies to handle code gaps:
(1) it searches for common code sequences (e.g., [push bp;
mov bp, sp]). We inferred this from the kernel option of
mark typical code sequences as code [1] and the test-case
in Listing 11; (2) it considers addresses in the .eh_frame
sections for recursive descent. This is inferred from the enable
EH analysis kernel option, confirmed by comparing the results
with and without the .eh_frame section; (3) it also performs
recursive descent at the targets of d2c xrefs. This is inferred
from the create function if data xref data→code32 exists kernel
option, verified by comparing the results with and without
certain xrefs; (4) it coagulates the remaining bytes in .text
as code or data (the make final analysis pass kernel option).
Symbolization: It is in general hard to infer how exactly IDA
PRO and BINARY NINJA do symbolization. We empirically
learned the following strategies: (1) The two tools do not use
heuristics 8 , 10, and 12 (2) BINARY NINJA rarely considers
d2c and d2d xrefs. (3) The majority of c2d xrefs identified by
BINARY NINJA are constant address operands. (4) IDA PRO
will seek to symbolize the data unit at the target of a c2d xref.
It will further seek to symbolize the neighbors of the data unit
at the target location.
Function Entry Identification: Both IDA PRO and BINARY
NINJA consider the targets of direct/indirect calls as function
entries. They further apply some other approaches.
BINARY NINJA adopts the idea from [6] to facilitate iden-
tification of function entries. It traverse the inter-procedural
CFG and groups all the connected basic blocks as a function.
Similar to many open source tools, BINARY NINJA also
considers targets of tail calls as function entries.
IDA PRO leverages at least two other strategies to identify
function entries: (1) it considers certain (but not all) addresses
in the .eh_frame section as function entries. This is con-
firmed by comparing the results before and after removing the
.eh_frame section; (2) it considers the targets of certain
d2c xrefs as function entries. We inferred this by comparing
the results before and after we intentionally destroy some d2c
xrefs. However, thus far we are not fully aware of how IDA
PRO selects .eh_frame items and the xrefs.
Indirect Jumps: Based on [84], BINARY NINJA implements
VSA to handle jump tables. As discussed in § IV-B4, BINARY
NINJA also resolves 120 hand-crafted indirect jumps, however,
with wrong targets. It remains unclear how BINARY NINJA
internally handles the 120 cases.
According to [1], IDA PRO [49] relies on patterns to detect
jump tables. We further crafted test-cases (e.g., Listing 12) to
demonstrate that IDA PRO does not use VSA analysis .
Indirect Calls: We infer how BINARY NINJA and IDA PRO
handle indirect calls by examining their results with our
benchmark binaries (recall § IV-B3).
All the targets found by BINARY NINJA are constants
propagated to the call sites. According to [76], this is achieved
by path-sensitive data-flow analysis to calculate the ranges
or disjoint sets of values (or VSA in general). Based on
our further communication with the developers, the scope of
analysis is intra-procedural.
IDA PRO found two types of targets. The first type is
propagated from constants in the current function. The second
type all follows the format in Listing 9. We envision that IDA
PRO uses data-flow like constant propagation to handle indirect
calls and applies patterns to find function tables.
Tail Calls: BINARY NINJA considers a jump as a tail call if
the target is outside of the current function and the stack has
a zero offset [84]. IDA PRO does not particularly handle tail
calls, as clarified by their technical support team.
Non-returning Functions: Our analysis shows that IDA PRO
and BINARY NINJA are detecting a similar group of non-
returning functions as DYNINST. The difference is mainly
caused by the recognition of non-returning library functions.
Further, the three tools have comparable precision and recalls.
This indicates that IDA PRO and BINARY NINJA are using
similar recursive strategies to DYNINST.
G. Interesting Cases and Test Cases
1 popfq
2 .byte 0xf3,0xc3
3 .size AES_cbc_encrypt
4 .align 64
5 .LAES_Te:; data in code
6 .long 0xa56363c6
1 popfq
2 repz retq
3 nop
4 nop
5 (bad);disassembly error
6 movslq -0x5b(%rbx),%esp
Listing 2: An example of data-in-code. This example comes
from Openssl, where hand-crafted data are appended after
code (left). Both OBJDUMP and ANGR incur errors in this case.
1 mov 0x6ab8a0, %esi
2 mov %rbx, %rdi
1 ; data;
2 0x6ab8a0: 69 00 64 00
3 ...
1 ; wrong decoding
2 640069: add [%rax],%eax
3 64006b: add [%rax],%cl
4 ...
5 640126: call unwind
6 ; non-return
Listing 3: A false postive of xref in Xalan_base. GHIDRA
wrongly identifies the operand 0x6ab8a0 (line 1 left-upper)
as a pointer and makes erroneous disassembly.
1 ; load base address
2 1b: lea 0x8a(%rip),%r8
3 22: movzbl %cl,%ecx
4 25: movslq (%r8,%rcx,4),%rax
5 29: add %r8,%rax
6 2c: jmpq *%rax
1 ; jump table
2 ac: 84 cb ec ff
3 a0: dc cb ec ff
4 b4: 04 cc ec ff
5 b8: 14 cc ec ff
6 ...
Listing 4: Jump table with 4-byte entries in 64-bit Gold Linker.
1 004286ab: add 0xfb49eb,%rax
2 ...
3 00fb49eb: undefined1 [11760811]; invalid address
Listing 5: A xref error in zeusmp_base. Operand fb49eb
points to invalid data but GHIDRA symbolizes it.
1 mov $0xe,%ebx
2 movzwl 0x4e33be(%rbx),%eax; operand = 0x4e33be
1 0x4e33b9: 00 00 00 00; end of .fini
2 0x4e33be: (bad); invalid memory address
3 0x4e33c0: 04 e3 3b 00; begin of .rodata
Listing 6: A xref in Busybox. At line 2 (upper part),
the constant operand points to an address (0x4e33be) in-
between .finit section and .rodata section (lower part).
1 804f16c: 61 00 00 00 f7 c1 04 08; Unicode
Listing 7: Xref missed by ANGR in addr2line. At
0x804f16c, ANGR detects a Unicode and jumps to
0x804f171, missing the pointer at 0x804f170.
1 callq 42ae30; non-returning
2 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
3 00 00 00; padding
4 cmpq $0x0,0x68(%rsi); start of a function
5 je 406f38
Listing 8: A missed function entry (line 4). The disassembler
assumes code after line 1 falls through and includes code at
line 4 to the preceding function.
1 app_main = {
2 test_main,
3 acpid_main,
4 ...
5 }
1 void run_app(int app){
2 ...
3 app_main[app](argc);
4 ...
5 }
Listing 9: An indirect call that can be handled by IDA PRO.
This indirect call uses a target from a function table.
1 switch(which){
2 case 't': ...
3 ...
4 default:
5 undefined();
6 }
1 ; no restriction on %al
2 sub $0x64,%eax
3 movzbl %al,%eax
4 movslq (%r10,%rax,4),%rax
5 add %r10,%rax
6 jmpq *%rax
Listing 10: A jump table with unrestricted index in dwp. The
default case in source code transfers to undefined behaviors,
which is compiled into jump tables without index restriction.
1 pop %ebp
2 jmp 8048430
3 ;new function
4 push %ebp
5 mov %ebp, %esp
1 pop %ebp
2 jmp 8048430
3 ;new function
4 push %eax
5 mov %ebp, %esp
1 pop %ebp
2 jmp 8048430
3 ;new function
4 db 50h ; P
5 db 89h
Listing 11: Test-case to infer IDA PRO’s disassembly. The
code has a function (line 4, left part) that carrys a common
prologue but is never referenced. IDA PRO correctly disassem-
bles the code. After altering the instruction at line 4 (middle
part), IDA PRO considers the code as data (right part).
1 cmp $4, %rax
2 ja .Ldefault
3 ...
4 cmp $0, %rax
5 jle .Ldefault
6 ...
7 jmp *branch_tbl(,%rax,8)
Listing 12: Hand-crafted jump table with rax as the
index. Tools with VSA analysis, like BINARY NINJA and
DYNINST, figure out rax ranges from 1 to 4. IDA PRO
wrongly considers rax ranges from 0 to 4.
